

**Great Britain and the United States:
Analogy of Two Great Powers Separated by
Time and a Common Language**

**A Monograph
By**

Colonel Michael C. Sevcik

United States Army

**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2000-2001

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2001	2. REPORT TYPE monograph	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-02-2001 to xx-04-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Great Britain and the United States: Analogy of Two Great Powers Separated by Time and a Common Language		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Sevcik, Michael C. ;		5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66048		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE ,		

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**14. ABSTRACT**

In many respects, America's military, economic and diplomatic situation in 1991 resembled Great Britain's in 1919. Rather than reduce global commitments, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in a number of global interests, many which would demand the use of military force. The general expectation that the collapse of the Soviet Union would entitle a quid pro quo ?peace dividend,? a relaxation foreign policy and a lessened military engagement policy was and still is, dangerously wrong. Vital, self-interests demand the United States embrace her leadership role as the world's ?indispensable nation? in providing for stability for volatile regions of the world. To protect diplomatic, cultural and economic interests, the United States must remain engaged in global affairs. Foreign policy however, cannot be reactive, it must shape the ?brave new world? through a balanced approach to economic, diplomatic and informational activities. Most importantly, as the British learned almost a century ago, a strong military capability and the will power to use force to engage the international environment must back foreign policy. While Great Britain's *oderint dum metuant* policy of the 19th Century may be too draconian for the democratic United States in the 21st Century, Britain's minimum force policy, ?a heavy hand with restraint? provides a meaningful historical example. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union destabilized many regions in the world. Former Soviet client states like Iraq were free to exercise regional attempts for hegemony. The Persian Gulf War ensued. In the Caucasus, horrific and violent warfare, anarchy and ethnic cleansing engulfed the region. In Eastern Europe, nationalistic tendencies and racial hatred which was long dormant under the iron rule of the USSR now emerged in states such as Yugoslavia, with a brutal and destabilizing regional impact. China was free from the long-term massive military concern on her northern border. North Korea, deprived of Soviet military, economic and political support, turned to nuclear and missile technologies in order to blackmail the west. The self-balancing, bipolar-sphere of American versus Soviet global politics, exploded into many controversial and unstable regions. As validated by Great Britain almost a century before, the United States would need a much more active foreign policy. As this monograph demonstrates, a stronger, larger and modernized military force to back the multitude of United States strategic interests cannot be substituted by wishful thinking, treaties, the promise of technology or a new-age Ten Year Rule. This work examines the question: Do the similarities and differences between Great Britain in the post-World War I era and the United States in the post-Cold War era, point to a parallel unwillingness in facing global responsibilities?

15. SUBJECT TERMS

peace dividend; foreign policy; post-Cold War era

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

Same as
Report
(SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

84

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Burgess, Ed
burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil

a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171
----------------------------------	------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--	--	--

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Colonel Michael C. Sevcik

Title of Monograph: Analogy of Two Superpowers

Approved by:

Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D. _____ **Monograph Director**

Advanced _____ **Director, School of**
COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS _____ **Military Studies**

_____ **Director, Graduate Degree**

Accepted this 23rd Day of May 2001

ABSTRACT

In many respects, America's military, economic and diplomatic situation in 1991 resembled Great Britain's in 1919. Rather than reduce global commitments, the end of the Cold War saw an increase in a number of global interests, many which would demand the use of military force. The general expectation that the collapse of the Soviet Union would entitle a *quid pro quo* "peace dividend," a relaxation foreign policy and a lessened military engagement policy was and still is, dangerously wrong. Vital, self-interests demand the United States embrace her leadership role as the world's "indispensable nation" in providing for stability for volatile regions of the world. To protect diplomatic, cultural and economic interests, the United States must remain engaged in global affairs. Foreign policy however, cannot be reactive, it must shape the 'brave new world' through a balanced approach to economic, diplomatic and informational activities. Most importantly, as the British learned almost a century ago, a strong military capability and the will power to use force to engage the international environment must back foreign policy. While Great Britain's *oderint dum metuant* policy of the 19th Century may be too draconian for the democratic United States in the 21st Century, Britain's minimum force policy, 'a heavy hand with restraint' provides a meaningful historical example.

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union destabilized many regions in the world. Former Soviet client states like Iraq were free to exercise regional attempts for hegemony. The Persian Gulf War ensued. In the Caucasus, horrific and violent warfare, anarchy and ethnic cleansing engulfed the region. In Eastern Europe, nationalistic tendencies and racial hatred which was long dormant under the iron rule of the USSR now emerged in states such as Yugoslavia, with a brutal and destabilizing regional impact. China was free from the long-term massive military concern on her northern border. North Korea, deprived of Soviet military, economic and political support, turned to nuclear and missile technologies in order to blackmail the west. The self-balancing, bipolar-sphere of American versus Soviet global politics, exploded into many controversial and unstable regions. As validated by Great Britain almost a century before, the United States would need a much more active foreign policy. As this monograph demonstrates, a stronger, larger and modernized military force to back the multitude of United States strategic interests cannot be substituted by wishful thinking, treaties, the promise of technology or a new-age Ten Year Rule.

This work examines the question: Do the similarities and differences between Great Britain in the post-World War I era and the United States in the post-Cold War era, point to a parallel unwillingness in facing global responsibilities?

	TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page
APPROVAL PAGE.....		ii
ABSTRACT.....		iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....		iv
Chapter 1 Background		
The Geopolitical Environment and Research Question.....		2
Chapter 2 Great Britain In the Post-World War One Era		
- Background and historical setting.....		4
- Imperial commitments out of balance with capability.....		5
- Policy and lessons from:		
- Mesopotamia (Iraq)		10
- Turkish/Greece war		15
- Persia and the Soviet threat.....		17
- Ireland		19
- India.....		20
- The Ten Year Rule.....		22
- Fallacy of Peace from Treaties (Versailles & Locarno).....		25
Chapter 3, United States in the Modern Era		
- Background and historical setting.....		33
- U.S. commitments out of balance with capability.....		34
- Policy and lessons from:		
- The Base Force.....		36
- The Bottom Up Review.....		37
- The Quadrennial Defense Review.....		39
- The Ten Year Rule: Revisited.....		42
- Fallacy of Peace from Treaties (Iraq & N. Korea)		45
Chapter 4, Conclusion and Recommendations.....		
		54
Appendix 1-7.....		
		56
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....		
		67
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....		
		70

ENDNOTES.....	76
----------------------	-----------

Chapter 1, Background

THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

As the United States settles into its role as the lone superpower at the dawn of the 21st Century, uncertainty has returned. The new environment includes peace operations, no-notice deployments, reductions-in-force, the peace dividend, revolution in military affairs and a lack of a coherent doctrine. This new environment is not unique. The Army has faced a future without a monolithic threat for most of its history. Predictably, after winning a war--the cold war victory is no different, political pressure to cash in on the ‘peace dividend’ to enhance domestic spending has cut deeply into the military budget. In most respects, the 1990s saw a reduction of military capabilities while American commitments have dramatically increased. There are numerous historical examples of nations that have been unwilling to provide for their long-term future security.¹ This monograph will examine if a similar situation occurred with Great Britain during the era between World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII). A valuable historical parallel to the post-Cold War United States is found by comparing Great Britain during the inter-war years between 1920 and 1939. After WWI, Great Britain, a great power with a global empire, let her military, and army specifically, decline to a point of weakness that was out of balance with global responsibilities. For all her efforts, Great Britain could not stop the decline that precipitated WWII. Great Britain’s numerous diplomatic initiatives, dependence on treaties and the disastrous Ten Year Rule, all contributed to a false sense of security that led to the reduction of military forces beyond reasonable levels. Great Britain’s post-WWI experience is analogous to the United States in the post-Cold War era. Britain’s defense and foreign policies during the years after WWI demonstrate an unwillingness to face their global

responsibilities for a peaceful and stable world vital to the nation's security. There are striking similarities, yet notable differences for the United States, in examining Great Britain almost a century later. Today however, the Untied States has the opportunity to learn from history, which may provide a better future.

THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Do the similarities and differences between Great Britain in the post-WWI era and the United States in the post-Cold War era, point to a parallel unwillingness in facing global responsibilities?

APPLICATION OF HISTORY TO THE FUTURE

Predicting the future is rife with pitfalls; however, there are many advantages in the rigorous study of history. Recall the words of George Santayana, who cautioned, “those who choose to ignore history are often destined to repeat it.”² An historical examination of post-WWI Great Britain is significant because of numerous parallels to the United States during the post-Cold War era. The specifically research focus of this monograph is on the land component forces in Great Britain (past) and United States (current). The influence of diplomatic efforts, treaties and policies will be evaluated in light of how their impact on land forces ability to fulfill the nation’s global responsibilities. Naval and air power historically played an important role in the defense policies of Britain in the past and United States today. Research will examine naval and air power issues to a lesser level to keep the monograph in compliance with the School of Advanced Military Science (SAMS) monograph criteria.

Chapter two of this study will look to the past and Great Britain's historical policy in dealing with her Empire following WWI. Chapter three examines the United States in the post-Cold War era from research parallels with the British experience. The historical study will conclude with application of Great Britain's example in the post World War I era to the United States today. Great Britain's successes, numerous failures and the parallels drawn from this study may serve as an important example to the United States. This study will quantify and discern the historical significance and lessons from an examination of Great Britain during the post-WWI era.

Chapter 2

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE POST-WORLD WAR I ERA

The sun never set on the British Empire in 1919. With one fourth of the landmass of earth under Great Britain's influence, she was at the zenith of power and influence. Great Britain's recently acquired possessions from Germany and the Ottoman Empire swelled the Empire's influence over a 450 million souls, spread throughout six different continents.³ A strange irony with Britain's arriving at the apogee of power was that there was no way to go but to fall off the pinnacle. Examination of this decline in the British Empire and the application to the United States is central to this case study. To understand how Great Britain's post-WWI foreign and defense policy led to the disaster of WWII, it is appropriate to understand the background of how she arrived at superpower status in 1919.

Great Britain's Expeditionary Army in August 1914 was a professional, well-trained but woefully small force. Her six infantry and one cavalry divisions were designed for and logistically supportable only in short and limited campaigns. Just four short later in 1918, Great Britain's contributions to the Western Front included five Armies and nineteen Corps (including Dominion forces). The overwhelming expansion rate is perhaps more evident in the raw manpower figures. In 1914, the strength of the Regular Army, Reserves and Territorial Forces was just over 700,000. By the Armistice, almost 1.8 million soldiers (one million combatants) were serving on just the Western Front! Over five and a half million British soldiers served on the Western Front during the war with over seven million enlistments (eight and a half million counting Great Britain's Indian Army).⁴ Great Britain's Navy, infant air forces and most

importantly, logistical capabilities were all equal to the task of supporting the Army, the Empire's foreign policy and Her global interests.

The growth, prestige and reputation of Great Britain were important elements to her rise to global, super-power status. The growth was touched on briefly above, but the prestige and reputation the British enjoyed as a result of World War I is important to this study. The pre-WWI concept of *showing the flag* was an instrumental component of Great Britain's rise to power. Warships throughout Asia, Africa and the Caribbean frequently contributed to the reputation of power by showing the flag. The presence of uniformed soldiers, sailors and marines marching through colonial towns/cities served to send a useful message about the power, reputation and prestige of the British Empire. Finally, the Roman concept of '*oderint dum metuant*', or 'let them hate as long as they fear' was apparent in the pre-WWI military. This arrogant attitude of British diplomats and soldiers provided an important part of Britain's concept of power. Ironically, British power depended on a heavy hand with restraint. By early in the 20th Century, British adopted a policy that balanced '*oderint dum metuant*' with a minimum force policy. Lastly, the utility of the Army to conduct stability and support operations was important. As will be demonstrated, the need for land forces, in massive numbers, was required to control the Empire's global interests. British Army leadership, especially the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in 1919, Sir Henry Wilson, learned just how manpower intensive global engagement can be for a great power. On his shoulders fell much of the enormous responsibility to balance the national requirement for soldiers with capability to provide them.

The concept of a balance of power in Europe was a central theme for hundreds of years. Power in Europe, during the years before WWI, was dangerously balanced between the nations of Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. After WWI, this balance was shattered with three of the powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia vanquished militarily and devastated economically. Only Great Britain and France remained as powers capable of dealing with the new era facing Europe and the world. The World War's Allied Powers, unified under wartime conditions, quickly saw the United States retreat to a 'head in the sand' approach to isolationism leaving Great Britain and France. After the war, France focused attention towards the east and internally towards European affairs. France correctly saw the Germany problem as a future threat and invested almost all their diplomatic and military power to mitigating that threat throughout the inter-war years.

This left only Great Britain as the 'indispensable' world power with both the ability and need to build and ensure the continued international peace and balance of power. This need for stability was a vital national interest and critical for Britain's continued prosperity and security. Arguably, Britain faced significant economic problems. Unemployment, the economy and conversion of the wartime industry were all major problems with no easy solution. The dilemma felt by the political leadership in Great Britain after the war was a classic question of whether to devote resources to domestic concerns or to those of external security. The maintenance of Great Britain's Armed Forces to the degree needed to provide international security for the lands, peoples and global interests would be costly indeed. A renowned British historian of the era wrote, "History is written backward but lived forward. Those who know the end of the story can never know what it was like at the time."⁵ This chronicle may best explain why the

British government, and most liberal democracies, seem unable to resolve the natural tension between domestic and external priorities.

The urgent need for rapid and drastic financial economies dominated all other post war considerations of the government. Great Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George often assured the public of his intent to 'provide a country fit for heroes to live in.' This philosophy certainly appealed and reflected the attitude of the war weary public. In addition to the horrific costs in lives during the war, Britain lost significant overseas investments and suffered from American and Japanese competition. Britain's trade was handicapped by the slow recovery of those she had recently vanquished in the war and the government faced a rising insurmountable public demand for more goods. After WWI, the erosion of Britain's industrial and commercial preeminence led to the decline of her naval, military and imperial strength. The slowdown of British productivity and decrease of competitiveness did not start with the end of WWI but rather was a continuation of British economic decline experience in the late nineteenth century.⁶ Paul Kennedy notes that by the start of WWI, Great Britain had seriously depleted gold reserves. This was in part because of the vast trade surplus of the United States in the early 1900s. Rather than circulated gold reserves, the United States treasury policy of accumulating gold led to almost one-third of the world's gold reserves were in the United States. Great Britain's economic downfall presented a devastating problem in financing the war.⁷ With the war over these financial considerations coupled with the overwhelming public belief that government should retrench meant that something had to give. It did, and the military became a prime target for cuts.⁸

In 1919, Prime Minister (PM) Lloyd George was looking to cash in on the “peace dividend” that was the ‘God given’ right of Britain’s victorious Army and citizens. They had endured the brutality of the war and in victory should reap the benefits of peace. A powerful personality, PM George did not tolerate those in his cabinet who saw a need for a strong military. In light of the recent war and its horrific impact, he hardly needed to. Most of the political leaders in Great Britain were eager to hop on the “peace dividend” band-wagon. Ironic that just as the people of Great Britain had given so much during the war, the hard fought victory would be squandered in the next several years. The few who did see the danger in the future and the need to win a full and lasting peace, were not heard. Great Britain political leadership created no consensus regarding a sound foreign policy for future and the result was the disaster of WWII.

Great Britain’s peacetime responsibilities at the end of WW I included imperial garrisons spread throughout the empire, enlarged by recent acquisitions in the Middle East. Additionally, British troops were stationed in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and Russia.⁹ At wars end, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson had over three and a half million men. One year later by 1919, that number fell to 800,000 and by November of 1920, just 370,000 active duty soldiers left due to rapid demobilization.¹⁰ This rapid reduction of forces turned out to be a noteworthy detriment to the Great Britain’s foreign policy strategy. Clearly, a vital national interest, it would take masterful synchronization of the diplomatic, economic and military resources to mold Great Britain’s empire towards stability and economic security. In only two years after the war, the

world's finest military was a hollow shell. This lack of military power would have disastrous repercussions for the nation in the years to come.

The rapid reduction in forces did not go unnoticed by the War Office. Only two days after the Armistice, the British Secretary for War, Lord Alfred Milner, wrote the Prime Minister urging that action regarding the future of the Army. Milner noted, “without some sort of line to go on, we shall be paralyzed at the War Office.” Warning sounded indicating that, “unless some provision is made for recruiting or keeping troops, you run the risk of finding yourself without any Army in six months. Considering the state of Europe and the revolutionary tendency in all countries it is as dangerous to have no Army as it is to have too big a one.”¹¹ In November of 1920, the imbalance between imperial manpower and the nation’s commitments was noted in a letter from Sir Maurice Hankey to the foreign secretary, A.J. Balfour. The dilemma was summarized as follows:

“The present times are not easy for our Military Authorities. They have a very young army on which heavy, indeed too heavy, demands are constantly being made. They are conducting difficulty military operations in Persia and in Mesopotamia; they have to supply garrisons of the Rhine, Constantinople, Egypt and Palestine; and the Irish affair is an immense strain on them. All this has to be done with an army of pre-war size.”¹²

“He who defends everything, defends nothing.”

*Fredrick the Great, Prussia*¹³

MILITARY OUT OF BALANCE WITH GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

Great Britain, at the end of WWI, had numerous global commitments. As the accelerated draw down of military forces continued in the years after the war, Britain's imbalance between military forces and global commitments became exacerbated. Rumblings of the Empire's instability came early in June 1920 from the 'mother of all' Imperial provinces, Mesopotamia (soon to renamed--Iraq). Great Britain possessed the land of Mesopotamia as a military administered province after the war. Mesopotamia by 1920, largely populated with Turkish Arabs, became engulfed with unrest. Additionally, in 1920 the final negotiations on the Versailles Treaty were still ongoing. This coupled with Britain's problems in Persia (from the newly formed Bolshevik Soviet Union) led to the local Arab faction(s) in Mesopotamia to demand independence. This desire manifested itself in June of 1920 when a band of insurgent tribesmen attacked the British Political Office in Rumaithah. This attack was the spark that lit the fire of insurrection in Mesopotamia.¹⁴ The countrywide revolt rapidly exceeded the British and Indian forces military capability to control the province. Although there were some 5000 British and 55,500 Indian troops in Mesopotamia, the effective force available to the General in Command (GOC), Sir Aylmer Haldane, was roughly half this force.

¹⁵ Imperial forces were unavailable due to sickness, in transit and employed to guard several thousand Turkish prisoners. Of the soldiers available to the GOC, many had serious training deficiencies as noted by Sir Arnold Wilson,

“Owing to their extreme youth and inexperience, most of the British troops could only be employed with advantage on garrison duty. One of the great difficulties is the fighting capacity of troops here. Many soldier had never fired a musketry course, much less seen a shot fired.”¹⁶

Because of these weaknesses but more importantly the lack of troops, the urgent call went out immediately for more troops. The local commander immediately became worried, fully comprehending the dangerous situation. COG Haldane wrote in his diary, “We are living on bluff and have been doing so for weeks, and it is a very trying game when the strain is prolonged.”¹⁷

The revolt in Mesopotamia was resolved by the dispatching of some 20 infantry battalions, numerous artillery and support soldiers from India. The force also included three squadrons of airplanes and armored cars. Great Britain had dodged a bullet and did not have to make hard decisions to bring back the balance between global responsibilities and enough troops to enforce those responsibilities. In time, due to the significant manpower and financial costs, Great Britain offered the throne of Iraq to King Faisal I as a compromise. The concessions towards autonomy coupled with the strong military response effectively quelled the revolt. This action allowed the withdrawal of soldiers. Internal control of affairs in Iraq was still an Imperial responsibility.

Faced with the excessive costs in manpower to maintain Iraq, the British turned to new technology. The post-WW I *revolution in military affairs (RMA)* pointed to air power that could efficiently substitute for manpower. The concept of RMA is not new to military historians. The promise of something for nothing considering Great Britain’s tremendous shortages of manpower and severe pressure for domestic spending, presented an irresistible enticement. The

British Cabinet Finance Committee estimated that annual costs of the Mesopotamia garrison would exceed 20 million pounds.¹⁸ This was clearly, an unreasonable cost for the benefits of the garrison. Winston Churchill, at the time Secretary of State for War and Air, offered a solution consistent with many modern proposals, “let’s have the estimate for the finance committee and leave it to the discretion of the War Office to work out the details.” Royal Air Force (RAF) planners led by Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, proposed a Mesopotamian policy of ‘air policing’ the desert. This proposal offered the hope of both controlling the land and accomplishing it with a substantial cost reduction—a have your cake and eat it proposition. This proposal held the promise of a potential solution for the imbalance in Britain’s global commitments and her military forces. The proposal adopted and the local commander, General Haldane, used air power to assist in putting down the revolution and for peace keeping duties at a significant reduction of costs. Was this a case of how air power working in conjunction with ground forces can economically achieve results? As a caveat, consider the impact of Great Britain’s diplomatic efforts. A political compromise that made it possible for King Faisal to have autonomy over Iraq played the major role in quelling the revolution. Without prescient diplomatic foresight, the background for successful military peacekeeping by use of airpower would not have been possible. Even with the compromise that led to King Faisal’s assumption of the throne meaning semi-autonomous Arab rule, Great Britain committed 100,000 troops (mostly Indian) to quelling the revolt in Iraq.

Elaboration of Great Britain’s problems in Mesopotamia is primarily due for two reasons. First, the Iraqi ‘incident’, truly a symptom of a bigger problem, took place at a time close to the end of the war. Britain could still have remedied the true problem—their imbalance

of forces with commitments. The episode in Mesopotamia was a symptomatic of this larger imbalance problem and is a central theme throughout the monograph. Additionally, the central importance of Great Britain's approach to Mesopotamia is found in the impression it left in the policy makers at the time. As is always the case after a disaster or near disaster in the case at hand, the inquiry starts immediately as to why the Army had not foreseen and adequately prepared for the coming revolution in Mesopotamia. The three air squadrons and armored cars sent by Britain were by any estimation, a success. While obvious limitations of air power existed, this new technology did allow for a significant reduction in the combat forces needed to further British interests in the region. The perception that the RMA and successful airpower could assure cheap solutions to the military problems facing Great Britain was overwhelmingly welcomed by the powers that be in government. This perception in the early 1920's encouraged an attitude of neglect and reduction in the traditional Army and would lead to disaster in future foreign policy.

Insert Map Here

19

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1918 – 1922

TURKEY

During the 1920s, Great Britain found herself entangled in crisis in Ireland, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and numerous other places. With the acute shortage of troops worsening, 1922 found Great Britain facing yet another people's revolution in the former Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Versailles allocated to Great Britain the lands of Turkey (Ottoman Empire). Making the matter more complex, Turkey claimed the Iraqi lands of the Mosul vilayet—about one third of what was then Mesopotamia.²⁰ As demonstrated above, operations in Mesopotamia were not smooth during the time immediately after WW I. In 1922, Mustafa Kemmel (*Ataturk*) was firmly in control of Turkey's Nationalist forces and more importantly, a threat to British allies (Greece) and their holdings in the region. This episode, known as the Chanak Crisis because Ataturk's forces threatened Great Britain's military garrison at Chanak, in eastern Turkey close to the Dardanelles. In Turkey, France and Italy undermined the agreement of Versailles for occupation of the neutral zone protecting the Straits. In October of 1921, the French secretly negotiated a peace treaty with Ataturk, while in April of 1922 the Italians followed suit. This left Great Britain the only allied power with troops in the region. Great Britain cast her lot with Greece, mainly because of military inadequacy regarding British forces in the region. In early 1920, Greek and British forces rapidly defeated the Turks on the Ismid Peninsula, in eastern Thrace and captured Adrianople. This defeat caused the Prime Minister to pronounce in the House of Commons, "The Turks are broken beyond repair."²¹ Actions in 1920 however, only partially defeated the Turks and left Ataturk in position to rebuild his forces. An important aspect of this early victory for Greek forces was that it masked the fact that Great Britain did

not have the forces to protect her interests in Turkey, nor to enforce the treaty of Sevres. Great Britain's weakness in military manpower was even in 1922, spreading on a global scale.

Ataturk ('Great-Father' Turk) became more popular and powerful after initially losing in battles in the summer of 1922. In August and September of that year, Turkish forces fought the Grecian King Constantine to a stand still in the battle at Sakarya River.²² While this battle was a standstill tactically, it was an overwhelming strategic defeat for Greece and Great Britain. This tactical draw put Greek forces on the defense and ensured Great Britain could not count on the Greeks to ensure victory and protect British interests. Perhaps most important of all, the standstill sent a signal to both Athens and London that made it clear this would be a very costly and time consuming war. In March of the following year, Lord Curzon met with French and Italian officials and came to an agreement that called for the complete withdrawal of Greek forces from Asia Minor. By July, King Constantine decided to break with all parties and attacked from Smyrna to Constantinople but the Allies, who had declared their neutrality, did not come to his assistance. Greece could not defeat the Turkish forces without military assistance from Great Britain. Ataturk, a competent military leader, took advantage of the weakness in Greek forces at Smyrna and assaulted them. Within a week, the Greeks were defeated and, "within a fortnight nothing but the corpses of Greek soldiers remained in Anatolia."²³ Some historians contend that the Chanak crisis hastened the fall of the Lloyd George government losing the 1923 election to PM Bonar Law and Britain's new Conservative administration. Through necessity, Great Britain played the diplomatic trump card and after the treaty resulting from the Lausanne Conference in 1923, British forces were withdrawn from Turkey. Keith Jeffery notes in his book about the British Army, that "Sir Henry Wilson had

maintained all along that the solution to Britain's problems in the Middle East lay above all in 'making love' to the Turk."²⁴

This case study illustrates the failure of Great Britain to maintain the balance between diplomatic goals and responsibilities with an essential part of national power, a strong military force. The economic realities facing Great Britain were dominating the nations' ability to balance requirements throughout Her global empire. The events in Turkey put at grave risk her woefully weak military forces, her prestige and stability throughout the Empire. A final important aspect of the Chanak crisis occurred September 15, 1922. Prime Minister Lloyd George sent a series of famous telegrams to the Dominions asking for assistance in case of war in Turkey. Only New Zealand agreed to support the war effort but with a contribution of only one battalion of infantry.²⁵ This tepid response from the Dominions sent a clear and concise message that Great Britain would stand alone in the crisis. This lack of "dominion" support coupled with Britain's excessive disarmament would be an important factor in British foreign policy until the outbreak of World War II. This incident takes on even more significance with the knowledge that Britain had abandoned her long-standing "conscription" policy shortly after WWI ended. Chanak manifested the end of the Imperial British Empire dealing from a position of military strength and the start of appeasement that would spell disaster in the years to follow.

OTHER GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

During 1921, the Soviet Union concluded treaties with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, confirming Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon's opinion that 'the Russian menace in the East is incomparably greater than anything else that has happened in my lifetime to the British Empire'.

²⁶ An incredible notion considering Great Britain's experience during WWI in the *killing fields*

just a few short years before.²⁷ Curzon was not alone in his loathing of the growing Soviet juggernaut. Winston Churchill, upon hearing that His Prime Minister, Lloyd George was toying with the idea of opening talks with the Russian Bolsheviks rushed to Downing Street and “told Lloyd George he might as well legalize sodomy as recognize the Bolsheviks.”²⁸

Great Britain’s need for oil and desire to deny it to the Central Powers, dominated Great Britain’s WWI interest in Persia (modern day Iran). After the war ended, Great Britain’s interest in Persia was dominated by Lord Curzon’s planned system for buffer states on the frontiers with Soviet Russia. Great Britain’s intent was to keep the Bolsheviks out of British areas of interest east of the Black Sea. The perceived threat from Russia to the modern day Middle East, India and Far East all had implications for the Empire. The problem for Great Britain was again, that of enough troops to properly maintain their interests in the country. While a strong advocate for maintaining the occupation of Persia, Winston Churchill was a realist. Teamed with Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, they recommended to Prime Minister George, the withdrawal of troops from Persia because of the severe shortages of manpower. By June of 1921, British forces were withdrawn from Persia.

²⁹ The concept of buffer states on the frontier with Russia was not to be.

Palestine was yet another territory of the British Empire that demanded attention. Palestine was given to Great Britain after the San Remo Conference in April of 1920, confirming the secret wartime agreement that allocated not only Palestine but Mesopotamia as well, to the British. France would get Syria and Lebanon as mandates.³⁰ Palestine, like Persia, was valuable to Great Britain’s global strategy because it was another buffer state, only this time against Egypt. The state of affairs in Palestine was complicated and when, Faisal’s brother

Abdullah, proclaimed as the ruler in Trans-Jordan in 1920, the difficult situation became violent.

Great Britain's pledge to stop Arab resettlement of the Trans-Jordan while controlling Jewish immigration led to Arab violence in May of 1921. More importantly for the purposes of this study, the violence demanded more soldiers to control both sides. As the situation has been for over 2000 years, and continues today, deep seated and mutual hatred between the Jewish and Arab populations created a problem to which the military is the only near-term solution. Palestine rapidly became a difficult situation when any British policy or position would create animosity between one side or the other, often both. Palestine represented another significant demand for British soldiers that she was ill prepared to afford.

THE IRISH TRAVAL

Ireland's impact on Great Britain's commitment for soldiers should have been slight but was immense. No less than 80,000 British troops comprised the Ireland garrison in July of 1921.³¹ In addition to the overwhelming strain the 'Irish ulcer'³² placed on the British Army, Ireland had a detrimental effect on the morale of Great Britain's soldiers.

Proponents and opponents of Irish independence in Great Britain, viewed home rule from the imperial perspective. On 22 Jun 1921, King George V declared that "everything which touches Ireland finds an echo in the remotes parts of the Empire."³³ This early variation of the 'domino theory' pervaded the leadership in Great Britain and contributed to the bloody Irish civil war lasting as long as it did. Although there can be debate on the degree of 'echo' losing Ireland would cause to Great Britain, there is no doubt that Ireland, in particular her ports and waterways, were strategically vital. Britain's ability to deal with the Irish problem was in part negated by her failure to introduce martial law except for several counties in the southwest.

Additionally, the disastrously stupid introduction the notorious ‘Black and Tans’ to Ireland in 1920-21, contributed to the Irish cause by uniting the general population and arousing public opinion in England.³⁴ The British Army occupying Ireland was inexperienced and poorly trained. They fought using techniques of the last battle of the Great War, tactics hardly appropriate in fighting a counter-guerrilla war against Sinn Fein ‘Free Staters.’ The Army was less inclined to acts of vengeance or pure terrorism, much more common among the Irish, but the British Army did get out of control and were guilty of gross acts of violence according to General Sir Hubert Gough. Irish desire for independence coupled with blatant terrorism eventually succeeded. After a series of negotiations which resolved that Great Britain would have access to Irish naval bases and waterways, thus ensuring Her strategic naval position, on 6 Dec 1921 South Ireland was granted her freedom by way of ‘dominion’ status.³⁵ Northern Ireland and the problems she represented would remain a problem for England for decades to follow. Nevertheless, while the Ulster border would have to be permanently guarded, Great Britain could now pull out troops, vitally needed throughout the rest of the Empire.

INDIA

The global trend towards nationalism after World War I found favor in India. Great Britain made concessions by way of the Montagu-Celmsford reforms in 1921. These reforms gave the Indian government and people more say in their government and were important to India remaining the loyal crown jewel until after WW II. Essential to Britain’s control in India was Gandhi, who through political genius and personal influence avoided nationalistic violence for almost fifty years.³⁶ The British forces in India in 1921 consisted of some 250,000 total soldiers with just under 60,000 purely British and 190,000 native soldiers, mostly commanded

by British officers. For over 50 years, the British Army in India was maintained by the Cardwell system.³⁷ Both the British and Indian native soldiers were financed by taxes raised in India. The solution to the Mesopotamia problem above is similar. A combination of diplomatic (King Faisal's ascension), technological (airpower/armored cars) and combat forces (two divisions from India) resolved this early crisis. In securing Indian support for the crisis, a serious warning was sounded by the Viceroy Army Department in India in response to Wilson's request.

“Recent demands received by us for reinforcements for Iraq on a large scale have forced us to consider the whole question of regarding the supply of overseas garrisons from Indian Army.”³⁸

The telegram went on to express concern about the additional requests expected from Britain, the lack of support in India, and the perception of India being exploited by sending a large percent of the troops while the rest of the dominions having no similar demands. The telegram closes by reminding Wilson that ‘India is an original member of the League of Nations, but it is Great Britain and not India which has received a mandate for new territories while the troops employed are largely Indian.’

India, in 1922, was paying for Prime Minister Lloyd George's rapid demobilization at the close of World War I. India sounded a warning shot that she would not be counted on to pay in blood for Britain's foreign policy. Nationalist sentiment was already on the rise in India, as it was in much of the rest of the British Empire. The dominions, who wholeheartedly supported the WWI efforts, were almost universal in their denial of requests to provide troops to the post-WWI Empire.

Britain's military weakness was woefully out of balance with her ability to provide deterrence. Weakness undermined the British policy of '*oderint dum metuant*' because there

was nothing left to fear. The “hands off” diplomacy had no chance to survive because Britain’s adversaries knew there was no capacity to meet the Empire’s global security interests. Britain overtaxed her military with troop commitments exceeded capabilities. Nationalistic uprisings throughout the Empire magnified the shortage of military power, vitally needed to protect Britain’s interests. Equally demanding were domestic concerns that mandated the reduction of forces. Numerous incidents of civil unrest in England after the war placed additional demands on an already over-stretched military.³⁹ These compelling two-way demands set in motion a War cabinet strategy that gave birth to the Ten Year Rule. The Ten Year Rule hypothesis would allow for satisfaction of long term military risks while allowing Britain to meet the short-term domestic needs of the nation.

*It is Seductively Easy to See What One Wants to See or
What One Expects to See.*⁴⁰

Joe Strange

THE TEN YEAR RULE

In 1919, Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Hamilton-Gordon set up the *Committee on the Organisation of the After War Army*. The committee reported on 26 July 1919 and noted that the Regular Army’s principle function was to ‘furnish the framework of the national organization both for training and mobilization in the event of war.’ The committee recommended a field army of 20 divisions, each with the capability to form a second division during mobilization. With these additional divisions, the nation would have over 40 divisions in case of war. They reasoned that compulsory home service during peacetime and volunteers would provide the 150,000 recruits needed annually.⁴¹ Historians generally agree that this

committee is the genesis of the Ten Year Rule.⁴² The Ten Year Rule was a concept that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years and that no Expeditionary Force is required for military purposes. The Ten Year Rule, originating from a 15 August 1919 Cabinet meeting on future military expenditures and financial guidelines. The main directives of the meeting held that principal functions of the military was to provide for the Empire's garrisons, control the newly mandated territories under British Control and provide support to civilian authority at home. Finally, the Cabinet meeting directed that the maximum annual budget would be *L* 60 million and *L* 75 million for the Navy and Army/RAF respectively.⁴³ Author of this directive and the probable originator of the ten-year rule was Great Britain's Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey.⁴⁴

The Ten Year Rule held much promise for Great Britain in the post-World War I Empire. If there were no major potential enemies for ten years, the military could incur severe cuts without significant risk. The government could now embark with a policy of domestic, economic and social spending that would encourage employment, and 'a country fit for heroes to live in', and perhaps most importantly, contribution to the re-election of politicians. Opposition to the Ten Year Rule by the services and War Office was resisted but largely to no avail. In 1921-1922, the Committee on National Expenditure recommended severe reductions in the military and fully accepted the implications of the Ten Year Rule. This committee, named after its chairman, Sir Eric Geddes, became known as the "Geddes Axe." The Geddes axe fell in 1923 with significant reductions in manpower (over 50,000), cuts in ancillary and auxiliary services and budget reductions to the Army/RAF from *L*75 to *L*55 million. Additionally, the committee recommended that further savings (and personnel reductions) as a result of new arms

(such as tanks) and the advent of the Royal Air Force as a substitute for troops on the ground.

45

Great Britain tried to balance the problems of military power and the costs it inevitably incurs with the need for domestic spending. Not all in Britain rolled over or signed up for the Ten Year Rule and the massive cuts in Britain's military. J.F.C. Fuller wrote about this paradox in 1922. "Because we lack money, we cannot increase the size of the army to fit the Empire; consequently there is only one thing we can do, namely, reduce the size of the Empire to fit our Army." He offered two solutions.⁴⁶ First, abandon large tracts of the Empire, clearly not desirable. Second, Britain could increase our present speed of military movement so that our securities through enhanced mobility may be brought into balance with our liabilities. By default, Great Britain opted for the first. What happened was a moderately successful political compromise in Egypt, Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia. In Ireland and India, the British grudgingly gave legitimacy to national aspirations at the point of a gun. Clearly, a failure occurred with British policy in Persia, Turkey, South Russia (anti-Bolshevik campaign) and in Palestine (still significant unrest). Arguably above the only moderately successful campaign that leveraged the technological revolution was in Iraq where the air campaign contributed significantly to reduction in forces.

The Ten Year Rule became a semi-permanent feature of British foreign policy critically tied to the reduction of Britain's military power. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the British leaders in the early 1920's to see a hypothetical war ten years into the future. With Germany disarmed, Britain had ten years to raise a military force to deal with potential aggression. The British Army was fully committed to protecting interests of the Empire and besides, the financial

issues in reducing taxes, providing for domestic programs was more real for the present than the potential threat of the future. Overriding all these considerations was the security and safety found in the series of post- WWI peace treaties. It had been a war to end all wars, the League of Nations governed the international scene and Great Britain had ‘Versailles’ and the Spirit of Locarno.

British historian Brian Bond eloquently records the problem with the Ten Year Rule.


“The greatest drawbacks to the concept of a Ten Year Rule only became fully apparent after its demise. Ten years is an extremely long time in terms of international relations, but a comparatively short time for a largely disarmed and pacific democracy to rearm for a major war against more than one potential enemy. It is hard to understand how supporters of the extension of the Rule from 1925 onwards can have deluded themselves on the two vital questions: would Britain’s potential enemies be so considerate as to allow her ten years to rearm once the warning signal had been accepted; and would she have the will power and industrial capacity to make the tremendous effort required in time?”⁴⁷

VERSAILLES & LOCARNO: THE PROMISE OF PEACE

The First World War finally ended with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 Jun 1919 at the Hall of Mirrors, in the Palace of Versailles near Paris. When Britain, France and the United States (known as the Triple Entente) negotiated the treaty, they did so with almost complete carte blanche power. If Germany refused the unconditional surrender, or any part thereof, the Entente could occupy Germany, thus ending Germany’s status as a sovereign nation. Germany was unwilling to take this risk and forced to accept the harsh and punishing demands. Appendix 2 provides a detailed description of the Versailles Treaty and explains the provisions. The United States senate never ratified the Versailles Treaty. United States President Woodrow Wilson incited controversy with the Fourteen Points presented to Allies

and Germany.⁴⁸ The United States President supported of global nationalistic sympathy and determination evoked the scorn of British and French leaders during the series of conferences leading to the Versailles Treaty signing in 1919. After WWI the United States slipped into a general foreign policy of isolationism and ignored European affairs not specifically associated with economic issues.

The Versailles Treaty in itself was not the cause of World War II, but no one can argue that it did not result in bitterness from and economic hardship to the German people. In this way, the shortsightedness of Britain and France significantly contributed to the War that did start in 1939. Great Britain and France were overly vindictive in as well initially demanding \$ 5 billion after the war and another \$ 25 billion in the reparations in 1921. After demanding incredible financial reparations, they also took away German territory and her only means to produce the economic wealth needed to pay off the reparations. By taking away Germany's colonies and her coal-producing territories, future income and industry could not successfully hope to pay the debts.



Paris Peace Conference

After defeating Germany in World War I, the victorious parties found it difficult to agree on the price Germany should pay in war reparations. Leaders from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy met at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and drafted the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty mandated a number of restrictive and compensatory measures for Germany, including massive demilitarization and financial reparations. Representatives at the conference included, left to right, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, Italian Foreign Minister Giorgio Nitti, French Premier Georges Clemenceau, and U. S. President Woodrow Wilson.

UPI/BETTMANN⁴⁹

The Versailles Treaty, known as the ‘Carthaginian Peace’ in England, due to the harshness of terms it imposed on Germany. In France, the Treaty was regarded as too light because it left the German state the potential to rebuild and threaten France. In Britain, not everyone agreed with the harsh and almost inhuman demands of the treaty. Leading economist of the time, John Maynard Keynes said, “The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions and depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable. Nations are not authorized, by religion or by natural morals to visit on the children of their enemies the misdoings of parents or rulers.⁵⁰ Additionally, many leaders in Britain agreed with Winston Churchill’s view that Versailles was “grimly polished and

trellised with live wires” over which the British prime minister, Clemenceau repeatedly tripped.

⁵¹ Churchill tried in vain to dilute Britain’s draconian demands on the Germans. When campaigning for office he often told constituents the Germans must be clothed, sheltered, fed and that the Allies ought not “be drawn into extravagances by the fullness of their victory.” ⁵²

The purpose of the treaty in broad terms was first, to create a balanced European order more favorable to the Allies. National demarcations of the previous Ottoman, German, Austrian and Russian empires were changed in favor of the Allies. Balance of power as a European strategy had been a goal for centuries. Second, the Treaty was designed to economically compensate France, Britain and Belgium in terms of land and reparations. Finally, the treaty would prevent Germany from rebuilding a military capability that would threaten another war of aggression. The design of the Treaty was to enable the Allies to stop any German aggression before it could pose a viable threat to France, Belgium or Great Britain.

When dealing with complex situations and uncertainty, people tend to focus on a narrow viewpoint. Versailles allowed the Allies to become overconfident. In itself, Versailles was not definitive. Locarno and a host of other post-WWI follow-on treaties however, followed Versailles. ⁵³ The treaties coupled with confidence in the League of Nations and the overwhelming desire to return to domestic spending; gave the Ten Year Rule heightened legitimacy in the minds of Britain’s political leadership. Considered alone, none of these influences would convince reasonable leaders to make unrealistic assumptions regarding decisions contained in the Ten Year Rule principle. However, taken as a whole, it is easy to see how the “spirit of Locarno” seduced Britain and her Allies, into a post war policy that eventually led to WWII.

Anne Orde, biographer of British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin said of the Locarno era:

“Britain herself retired behind the veil of security, into a form of isolation which persisted into the early 1930s; and disarmament, on which the whole imposing structure rested, never came. When the Pact was tested in 1936 it broke and thought the worst was then hidden, the reasons for its failure could not be disguised: no agreement, however binding can last ten years without constant and careful thought. The mechanism of the Pact rested on military strength; and there of the five partners (Britain, France and Belgium) abandoned their strength. Baldwin was to find the fruit mere Dead Sea ashes when he came back to power.”⁵⁴

After initially making a good-faith effort to comply with Versailles, Germany began a systematic and deliberate long-term revolt against the provisions of Versailles. Deprived of territory, limitations on her military and facing severe economic penalties, Germany resisted all three aspects of the Versailles Treaty. Germany began violating the treaty immediately after the signing. The economic violations of Versailles and severe hardships to Germany's population are well documented.⁵⁵ The minor military violations and incidents were as individual actions insignificant, however, taken in the context of the next twenty years proved to undermine the very purpose of the treaty. The military violations over time negated the Allies ability to enforce Versailles while strengthening Germany's ability to violate it. Versailles reduced the German military to 100,000 troops. German post-World War 1 domestic riots and demonstrations gave the German government the legitimate need to increase her military to 200,000.⁵⁶ The domestic unrest, coupled with the growing Bolshevik threat and a host of unrelated arguments, gave partial legitimacy to the request. The fact is Germany never reduced her armed forces to 100,000 even after the Spa Conference in 1920. France agreed to let the Germans have until 1921 to reduce their forces and compelled Britain to agree with the occupation of the Rhineland

by Allied forces if Germany failed to comply. Two problems with this agreement: Britain was already stretched militarily as demonstrated above. Additionally, the fear and perceived threat of Germany falling to the Bolsheviks, was an important consideration.

On the political compliance side of the Treaty, the Inter Allied Control Commission (IACC) inspections of Germany for several years proved a farce. While completing inspections from 1921 through 1925 the IACC noted that police put up little resistance, but the military authorities in Germany were another story. German military authorities obstructed inspectors to the point that the IACC reported it was part of an organized plan.⁵⁷ The IACC made it clear, as did others before it, that the Germans did not comply with the treaty, nor was there any intention to comply. Historian Barton Whaley notes that Germany's covert rearmament can be divided into three periods: disarmament (1918-1920), covert arms evasion (1920-1926) and clandestine rearmament (1927-1935).⁵⁸ During disarmament, the IACC worked diligently and carefully inventoried weapons, stockpiles and equipment. Germany, as part of a deliberate plan, reduced the frequency and duration of inspections. During the covert arms evasion period, Germany worked hard to stabilize military industry and their economy. Aircraft, tank and other new technology were rapidly enhanced. Cooperation with Russia (aircraft) and Finland (submarine) proved to be the order of the day. Military experimentation, research and development were embraced later in the 1920s.

Lastly, German paramilitary groups that were banned by the Treaty actually prospered and matured in the 1920. Citizen ownership of guns flourished. Post-WWI Germany saw thousands of citizens with handguns and aggressive paramilitary training. One militant veteran's organization the Stahlhelm (steel helmets) numbered 800,000 in the mid-1920's. It was

completed absorbed into Hitler's first army with the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.⁵⁹

With a population of 80 million in 1920, military manpower potential far exceeded the combined French and British potential.

Thus, in 1933 when Hitler came to power in Nazi Germany, he inherited an explosive situation. Germany had a relatively small military but massive military potential. Unemployment in the 1930s contributed to this military potential and had a significant impact on potential industrialization. Finally, the harshness of Versailles planted the seeds of discord that ran deep throughout the German people. The British were shocked with the speed in which Hitler rearmed, but they should not have been. The IACC reports made it clear since the early 1920s that rearmament was being carefully planned and executed. Knowledge of treaty violations was not the issue for the Allies knew well of the violations. The problem was that Britain did not have the military capability to execute the provisions of Versailles. If she had maintained the Armed Forces and kept pace with new technology like the tank, Britain would have been able to deal with the Germans from a position of strength.

The British, during the post WWI era, rapidly disarmed their once great military power in order to focus the nations finances on domestic concerns. Additionally, the British diplomatically worked to retrain and nullified France's efforts to restrain a revived and powerful Germany. Finally, Britain ignored the repeated warning of the IACC that warned of the clandestine rearmament in Germany. British historian Correlli Barnett notes:

“Britain did not merely display a characteristic escapism and self-deception but, the realities of power and strategy having been left so far behind, now veered positively into fantasy, like an unsound financier who, devoid of cash resources, deludes himself and his creditors with grandiose paper transactions.”⁶⁰

Barnett's reference to grandiose paper transactions parallel the paper transactions of Versailles, Locarno and other post-WWI agreements. The League of Nations and all her peaceful initiatives were nothing without a strong military and the armed forces to back them. The *oderint dum metuant* policy served Britain for centuries and gave London an Empire, on which the sun never set. England declared peace after successive German disarmament in 1919, 1922 and 1925. Britain assumed the Ten Year Rule and turned to reaping the domestic and economic benefits. Rather than assuming the role as a global leader and countering threats to European peace, Britain cut her military and abdicated leadership. The seeds of neglect in the 1920s were directly responsible for the compromises during the 1930s and resultant WWII.

Donald Kagen eloquently notes:

“By 1940, England was alone. Her allies had been crushed. Its forces had been hammered into the ground. Its own cities would soon be pounded from the sky and its citizens killed in their homes. With survival on the line, Britain had no more of its own resources to fall back on, nothing else to bring to bear. All might have been lost—but for a miracle. When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, Churchill knew that England would win the war. He can be excused for not reflecting at the moment on how little he, not to mention England’s other leaders, had done in the years of peace to deserve that victory.”⁶¹

Chapter 3

“There is nothing new, under the Sun.”

Ecclesiastes 1:9⁶²

Chapter three is a case study designed to examine the parallels in the United States post-Cold War era with Great Britain in the post-WWI era. This chapter contains examples that demonstrate both similarities and differences in United States policy today, compared with Britain in the 1920s. The monograph research will examine United States defense policy in light of Britain’s experience in the post WWI era. These case studies include the imbalance of land forces to mission capability that has existed since the end of the cold war. The study will close with a modern version of Britain’s Ten Year Plan as it applies to the United States in the post-Cold War era.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 marked the end of the four-decade *Cold War*.⁶³ The best-known symbol of the Cold War was the wall separating East and West Berlin and the *Iron Curtain* that separated Eastern Europe from Western Europe. The wall came down in 1989 and marked the end of the Cold War. Initially, the Soviet Union removed troops from Afghanistan, reduced troop strength by 500,000 and initiated serious military reforms. Next, a series of peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe disintegrated the Soviet “outer empire.” The Warsaw Pact disintegrated and East Germany was joined with West. The final phase of the fall was completed in 1991 when the Soviet Union experienced a severe economic and domestic crisis. The crisis, coupled with long dormant nationalistic tendency of the “inner empire,” led to the break up of the Soviet Union.

On Christmas Day, 1991 the infamous Soviet *hammer and sickle* was lowered from the Kremlin and replaced with the Russian flag. The Communist Party was out of power and the Cold War was over. The United States of America found herself the lone superpower on earth.

Great Britain was in a similar position at the end of WWI. She had the need, the ability and stated aim to organize the world in such a way as to ensure it stayed peaceful, thus providing for Her own stability and self interests. The first part of this study demonstrated that Britain did not have the will and vision to support her long-term interests of global economic security and peace through a strong military establishment. The second part of this monograph will demonstrate a similar lack of United States vision and will to accomplish the similar goals of global economic security and peace through strength.

THE UNITED STATES DRAWDOWN AND IMBALANCE

The end of the Cold War marked a return to an environment of uncertainty which American political leadership has not faced since the end of WWII. For the first time in decades, Congress and the President had to reevaluate the nation's role in a new world. Should domestic concerns and the economy be brought to the forefront of government attention? Was the world still a dangerous place for the United States and her Allies? Did a *peace dividend* exist and how much was it worth? Without a monolithic Soviet threat, had vital national interests changed, how so? All these and numerous other questions loomed. The size, organization and modernization of the armed forces all depend on the answers to these important questions.

The reduction of the military began during the Reagan administration. Between 1986 and 1990, the United States military budgets and defense appropriations were reduced by 10

percent. The fiscal year (FY) 2000 defense budget was the first budget in 15 years that contained a rise in defense spending. FY 2000 spending corrected for inflation, represented less than four percent of the United States gross domestic product (GDP). ⁶⁴ This dramatic decline in resources across all services, coupled with high demand from a booming economy, has made it harder to recruit high-quality volunteers. The consequent risk of these reductions, increased military obligations and the uncertainty inherent in the *novus ordo seclorum* (new world order), is growing everyday.

During the last decade, the United States military in numbers and capabilities has dramatically decreased. Over the past several years defense reductions had included 709,000 regular troops, 293,000 reserve troops, eight active divisions, 20 air wings, 232 strategic bombers, 13 ballistic missile nuclear submarines, 500 ICBMs, 4 aircraft carriers and 121 warships. ⁶⁵ At the same time the United States forces continue to shrink, they are being called on to engage in military operations on a global scale that is unprecedented in the nations history. The Army, which participated in 10 major operational events in the 31 years between 1960 and 1991, participated in 26 operational events since the end of the Cold War. ⁶⁶ The Marine Corps' participation in contingency operations has increased three-fold in comparing the last ten years with the previous ten. The Navy and Air Force are experiencing similar frequent, long-term deployments. ⁶⁷

In the few years since the end of the Cold War, there have been three significant military reviews. In 1990-92, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell initiated the *Base Force Plan*. Head of the House Armed Services Committee, later named Secretary

of Defense during the Clinton Administration, Les Aspin, initiated the *Bottom-Up Review* in 1993 and finally, in 1997 the *Quadrennial Defense Review* was completed. ⁶⁸

THE BASE FORCE

Even before he took office, General Powell began to plan for change in the Pentagon in the post-Cold War era. In a separate effort, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz developed his own concept for American strategy called the Base Force. Powell and Wolfowitz developed converging strategies that explicitly rejected the Soviet threat as the measurement to judge United States military organization, structure and budgets. ⁶⁹ General Powell's predictions in November 1989 anticipated the retrenchment of the Soviet Union towards a strictly defensive posture. He wrote about his predictions regarding the Soviet Union,

No Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe, Warsaw Pact replaced, East Germany gone, All Eastern-bloc "neutral states with multiparty systems, Germany reunified and Berlin undivided...Of course, trouble spots would persist and I identified them as "Korea, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf and Philippines. Considering potential U.S. involvement, I listed two places, "Korea and the Persian Gulf."

General Powell's base force concept then went on to anticipate the drawdown from a 550 ship Navy to 450 ships, troop strengths in Europe reduced from 300,000 to 75,000 and the active duty Army reduced from 760,000 to 525,000. The Marines, Air Force and reserves would be cut as well. ⁷⁰ With few modifications, the Base Force concept was adopted in the summer of 1990. President Bush adopted this new strategy for the post-Cold War era. As Iraq was invading Kuwait on 2 Aug 1990, he announced:

"In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of a global war---in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs

of regional contingencies and peacetime presence---we know that our forces can be smaller. We calculate that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25 percent smaller than today's. America's armed forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.”⁷¹

Additionally, President Bush stressed continued investment, research and development to maintain the technological edge and counteract potential adversaries' 'strength in numbers'. Because the base force maintained a significant percent of the Cold War strength and did not present a significant "peace dividend," it has been criticized as short sighted and a legacy of the Cold War force structure. What the base force concept does provide is the ability to deal with two, nearly simultaneous, major regional contingencies (MRC).

BOTTOM UP REVIEW

One of the most vocal critics of the *base force* concept was Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, and a Democrat from Wisconsin. Like British politicians almost a century before, the incentive to increase domestic spending was too great to resist. An essential fault in the base force concept according to Aspin, was that it could not be politically justified. Because the future is inherently unpredictable, the base force had no way to identify America's future enemies. Aspin's approach to the post-Cold War strategy was to assume no starting force structure. The approach examined the probable missions of the armed forces, assessed field commander's requirements and then calculated the force structure and equipment needed to accomplish the missions. This methodology became known as the *bottom up review* (BUR) and as Aspin argued, it was the antithetical to the administration's approach that had been a top-down effort.⁷² Aspin's plans initially called for continued cuts to the armed forces and essentially recommend a one MRC-force structure.

Aspin's strategy put the United States into a reactive defense posture. It assumed the United States would repel aggressors only after they attacked and the missions of the armed forces would be primarily for conducting limited humanitarian operations. Proponents for the *base force* justified their logic by emphasizing the role of the Armed Forces as a more active one in shaping regional policy and the international environment. Secretary of Defense, Richard (Dick) Cheney argued that:

Shaping our future security environment means more than simply accounting for changes in anticipated threats. World events have repeatedly defied even near-term predictions. In early 1989, no one predicted Eastern Europe would escape Soviet domination by Thanksgiving. In early 1990 no one predicted the America would be headed for war by Labor Day or that half a million troops would be in Saudi Arabia by New Year's 1991. In early 1991, few predicted the Soviet Union would be gone by Christmas. In earlier times, we have failed to predict Soviet development of atomic weapons, Sputnik, the North Korean invasion or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All are significant failures of prediction of major events in a very short time frame. As time lengthens, as we have to deal with longer time horizons our capacity to predict grow even less precise.

The history of the United States is replete with instances of major, unanticipated strategic shifts over five, ten or twenty year time frame. Sophisticated, modern military forces take many years to build and develop. Proper appreciation for uncertainty is therefore a critical part of any realistic defense strategy that builds forces that are going to allow us to deal with crises five, ten or twenty years hence.

We cannot base our future security on a shaky record of trying to predict threats or a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks to help shape the future, to actually alter the future. And, that's what the President's regional defense strategy seeks to do. ⁷³

Secretary Cheney argued the BUR and any system of defense that was based on visible threat had to be fundamentally wrong. More than just capabilities based defense, he argued that American defense policy must shape the regional and global environment. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, of which Les Aspin chaired, Cheney cautioned, "I want to remind the committee that never---never in this century have we every gone through one of

these periods of downsizing the force and done it right.” Cheney noted that the National Military Strategy concluded with a quotation from Winston S. Churchill:

“The conventional wisdom is that war is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the 20th century. Civilization has climbed above such perils. The inter-dependence of nations, the sense of public law has rendered such nightmares impossible....Are you quite sure? Pity to be wrong.”

For the moment, the Bush Administration had won. The base force became the blueprint for American defense policy in the post-Cold War era. This strategy supported the premise that America should actively engage in shaping the international environment and needed substantial military forces to do so. President Clinton appointed Aspin as the Secretary of Defense in 1993. Aspin immediately undertook a radical review of the Pentagon and post Cold War policy. During the next few years, defense budget cuts, missions and requirements of all services increased. The base realignment efforts of the Pentagon and some in Congress were only marginally successful, leaving an infrastructure burden on the military budgets. Aspin’s controversial plan was partially adopted by Congress.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Aspin’s review resulted in few force-structure changes. Since 1993 a number studies have determined the same result, that a 2-MRC’s requirement is valid.⁷⁵ Congress did however, adopt one significant provision Aspin’s BUR strategy. They wrote into law the requirement for an assessment of military needs and strategies by DoD and services every four years (the quadrennial defense review (QDR),).

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

By 1996 when Secretary of Defense William Cohen arrived at the Pentagon, the QDR was well underway. Gradual cuts had reduced the military to below base-force levels. During the next four years, stagnant defense budgets had a profound impact on readiness and

modernization of major equipment in the Pentagon came to a virtual standstill.⁷⁶ Recently, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Henry Shelton, has called the 1997 QDR a flawed study.

⁷⁷ General Shelton wants the new Administration to set strategic goals and then let Pentagon officials calculate the size and type force needed to achieve those goals. The 1997 QDR came to the fundamental conclusion that the United States should be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. It also recommended aggressive modernization of equipment and major weapons programs and continued efforts towards administrative/logistics efficiency. Finally, the 1997 QDR recommended that DoD policy and missions should continue with the BUR force structure.

While no analogy is perfect, there are numerous similarities between the approach the United States has taken regarding defense policy compared with that of Great Britain after WWI. As demonstrated above in the discussion of defense policy following the end of the Cold War, the reduction of military forces and budget exceeded the nation's capabilities. Ways, means and ends were uncoordinated. The armed forces were smaller in both number of units and percentage of gross national product than they had been since before WWII. Policy makers fell into the same trap that caught the British in the 1920s. This trap was the assumption that demobilization could only be successful if the size and budget of the force after the war was smaller than it had been maintained at, during the war. Yet, the global stage in the 1920s and 1990s had changed dramatically. The comprehensive base-force strategy demanded that the philosophical basis for America's future considered the fundamental role the United States would play in world affairs. This role would drive the strategy into the most serious challenges to that role, which turned out to be 'regional aggression on a large scale'. Although the base

force concept did not adequately provide the force structure to fight the 2-MRC option, it did recognize the principle as legitimate. The BUR, 97 QDR and resultant budgetary neglect during the past five years represents an incongruity between military and foreign policy.

This divergence is identical to Great Britain in the 1920s when it let its military fall to dangerous level considering Her Imperial requirements. The post-WWI environment demanded troops on a global scale to further Britain's interests. The League of Nations, Versailles and France all signaled the need for strong British armed forces to deal with a growing Wiemar and later Nazi threat. These requirements, coupled with British economic interests in the Far East, Mediterranean and Ireland demanded well-trained, deployable and ready forces in sufficient number to protect Great Britain's interests. Only after the requirements for forces are identified, should consideration be given to economic, domestic politics and other factors. Sometimes, this delicate balance cannot be achieved. Like British strategy after WWI, the modern-day American BUR rejected serious consideration for global engagement and shaping. United States foreign policy was reactionary to threats just like Britain's policy was in the 1920s. Like the British in the Middle-East, Asia and Mediterranean, the American military has no desire to be the "world's policeman." Today, United States Armed Forces are often called into police actions like Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, which results in a natural opposition. Intuitively, the incrementalism on a global scale with numerous deployments degrades the American armed forces ability to fight and win a major regional contingency. Perhaps no better implication exists than found in the budget cuts that repeatedly siphoned funds out of the services training dollars in the 1990s to fund peace keeping operations in the Balkans. Like Great Britain, resources for defense and foreign policy were determined before a comprehensive strategy was determined.

In both cases, the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of forces continues, year after year with the budgetary shortfalls accumulating. The BUR and 97 QDR hamstrung the United States into a long-term pattern similar to that of Great Britain in the 1920s. As demonstrated in the first part of this monograph, this pattern played a critical role in the downfall of the British armed forces and directly led to their great affliction during WWII.

NEW TEN YEAR PLAN

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) introduced in the post-Cold War era of the 1990s called for the technological dependence similar to Great Britain after WWI. Recall during the Chanak crisis above that Great Britain depended on a series of technological advantages to cut troop levels. Today, similar American faith in the promise of technology is responsible for the troop strength drawdown and an extravagant, over-priced infatuation that continues to invest defense dollars into high-priced but low relevance technology. Appendix 7 contains a detailed list of books, articles and web sites on defense spending and the magnetic enchantment of technology.⁷⁸ On 30 May 2000, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton released *Joint Vision (JV) 2020* announcement that extends, refines and builds on an earlier Joint Vision (JV) 2010.⁷⁹ JV 2020 is the natural follow-on to the Department of Defense (DoD) plan for the future. JV 2020 continues emphasis on four JV 2010 operational concepts—*dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection*—that the military must apply to achieve full spectrum dominance. JV 2020, however, emphasizes three factors central to the success of full spectrum dominance. These factors are *interoperability, innovation and decision superiority*. As a central

hypothesis, JV 2020 maintains the United States will face no peer competitor for the next ten years. In discussing this very topic Kagan and Kagan, write:

The concept of a “strategic pause” and the notion that the United States will face no major threats before 2010, probably before 2020, is a dangerous... It makes it easy to stretch out acquisition, research and development on the grounds that the United States is still “way ahead” of any potential aggressor. Worse still, it supports the increasingly widespread belief that current force structure is, if anything, extravagant for dealing with this ‘relatively secure’ period.

But the most dangerous part of the argument urges the United States to be prepared to fight *only* the next world cataclysm—not to be ready to head it off through deterrence or by a swift, devastating response to nip a growing threat in the bud.⁸⁰

As Britain experienced a century ago, the Ten Year Rule locked them into a false sense of security. Initially in the 1920s, the Ten Year Rule was a legitimate part of foreign policy. Over time however, the “rule” became entrenched in minds of British political leadership and by the 1930s it was too late. Naval and air forces acquisition cycles are difficult to correct in less than ten years. Great Britain learned the hard way and noted by historian Bond in the first part of this monograph, the Ten Year Rule was hard to resist. Ten years is a dangerously, long time in the shifting and ever-changing horizon of global politics and international security. Technologies in the 1990s make it even more dangerous with the advent of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. The following discussion of this monograph will examine a few of the most prominent threats to this long-term international security and discuss America’s failure in dealing with global engagement.

TREATIES

United States experiences in dealing with Iraq and North Korea since the end of the Cold War, provides the final analogy with Great Britain in this monograph. Similar to the peace resulting at Versailles, the series of American backed United Nations (UN) resolutions after the Persian Gulf War elicited hatred, resentment and revenge in the Iraqi people. Other similarities between Iraq and Germany lie in the fact that no territories were occupied, the capital was not seized and the Army that was not totally destroyed. Both victories led to the imposition of terms that were harsh in terms of weapons control, economic sanctions and financial punishment. There still is no long-term plan for peaceful conditions in the Mid-East. On 8 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 that detailed peace terms for the Iraqi government following the Gulf War.⁸¹ Like the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the imposition of terms on Iraq included restrictions on her military but not in specific numbers to troops or organization. The resolution mandated the dismantling of Iraq's ballistic missiles and established "no-fly" zones that restrict her air forces. More importantly, the resolution, reprinted in Appendix four, linked the lifting of economic sanctions to the provisions for inspecting Iraq's ability to produce, deploy or employ chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Like Germany after Versailles, since 1991, Iraq has engaged in a series of numerous small violations of which none were likely to evoke a massive response from coalition forces. Like the Germans in the 1920s, the Iraqi's for the next decade, would execute a series of minor perennial flash-ups.⁸² This pattern is so routine that CENTCOM leaders and soldiers call them the "Annual Spool Exercise." Appendix 5 provides a detailed listing of some of the more significant excursions that violate UN Resolution 687.

Like the IACC in the post-WWI era, the UN created a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to conduct on-site inspections of Iraqi biological, chemical and nuclear sites. The UNSCOM would also oversee the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. The commission was met with hostility and violence from the day it started attempting to complete its mission in Iraq. Starting in June of 1991, the Iraqi government has repeatedly stalled inspectors and concealed critical violations of the UN resolution.⁸³ In 1995 General Hussein Kamel Hussein, the former chief of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, which oversees the development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, defected to Jordan. Hussein Kamel's defection revealed documentation that proved the Iraq was pressing hard to develop chemical, biological and nuclear programs.⁸⁴ Like the IACC, almost a century before by mid-1996 the UNSCOM team was deliberately deceived and by the end of 1998, Saddam Hussein banned UNSCOM from Iraq. The coalition response was *Operation Desert Fox*, an extensive four-day bombing campaign designed to punish the Iraqi regime and inflict damage to their chemical, biological and nuclear programs.

NORTH KOREA

The second analogy to post-WWI Great Britain exists in the dealings between the United States with North Korea in the mid-1990s. The incident almost led to war in 1994 with North Korea's development of nuclear and ballistic missile potential. With the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost financial and diplomatic power on the world's stage. Relations with China chilled in the early 1990s leaving North Korea in an isolated and economically devastated position. In 1993, North Korea discovered that continued nuclear proliferation and development was a trump card in dealing with the West, specifically the United States. In

dealing with the United States, North Korea's nuclear threat provides another analogy to post WWI Great Britain and a superb lesson on how not to deal with rogue nations.

Since early 1993, Pyongyang had used its nuclear program as a bargaining chip for recognition, security assistance and economic assistance from the United States.⁸⁵ For the decade before the crisis, there had been a general thawing of relations between North Korea and the West. This all changed when the United States obtained firm evidence of the North Korea effort to develop nuclear weapons. In May and June of 1992 the North Korean government lied and concealed evidence from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of their development of a nuclear program. With access to sophisticated American laboratories, the IAEA presented firm evidence of weapons-grade plutonium that could not be extracted out of the "energy-producing" nuclear efforts of Soviet sponsored light water reactors (LWR), in North Korea since 1986. Before obtaining Soviet assistance for the LWR, North Korea had signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA officials identified two potential nuclear sites near the Yongbyon compound about 60 kilometers north of Pyongyang. United States satellite imagery revealed patterns at the Yongbyon compound similar to nuclear waste sites used in the Soviet Union and Iraq.⁸⁶ Concerned with the mounting evidence of a nuclear program in North Korea, IAEA director, Hans Blix called for special inspections of the suspected LWR sites. Throughout the rest of 1992 tensions mounted from a series of incidents in which both North Korea and the United States raised the stakes. North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT when pressed by the IAEA and western countries for on site inspection of the LWR facilities.

The United States, reminiscent of the British actions after WWI chose the sane option to negotiate with North Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea- DPRK). Just days before North Korea was to withdraw from the NPT, United States negotiator Robert L. Gallucci (Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs) met with The North Korean deputy Foreign Minister, Kang Sok Ju. One day before the deadline, a “joint statement” between the United States and DPRK announced that North Korea would suspend, indefinitely, their withdrawal from the NPT. In exchange, the United States assured the DPRK that it would not used armed forces, nuclear weapons nor threaten such use against North Korea and agreed to a continued bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang.⁸⁷

Almost immediately, the compromises reminiscent of Great Britain and the Versailles began. Initially, the North Koreans asked if the West could provide LWR facilities in order to abandon the existing reactors. In several months, North Korea offered that to stay in the NPT and submit to IAEA inspections if economic sanctions were lifted and United States “Team Spirit” exercises ended. Washington offered a two-phase deal. Phase one, North Korea allows IAEA inspections and renews dialogue with the South while the United States cancels the 1994 Team Spirit Exercise. In phase two, IAEA inspections of the two LWR site be permitted and the United States would offer diplomatic recognition, trade and investment concessions.⁸⁸ At this point in 1994, a combination of press releases, congressional activity, deployment of Patriot Missile Defense systems, the IAEA continued pressing for inspections, South Korea’s hard stance and the intransigence of the DPRK—led to the brink of war on the Peninsula.

The IAEA insisted throughout the crisis that on-site inspections of the LWR facilities were essential to ensure that nuclear material was not diverted to bomb production. The IAEA was looking to verifying the spread of nuclear materials, which was an essential part of their charter. The United States, fixated by the danger of war in Korea, saw the need to bring the DPRK back to the bargaining table regardless of the costs. In abandoning the IAEA position however, Washington was sanctioning the DPRK keeping the unknown number of weapons-grade plutonium it already had developed with the potential to build a small, but none the less, significant stockpile of nuclear weapons. In a letter to Congress from Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Congressional Committee Members of the Speaker's North Korea Advisory listed five dangerous issues from the 1994 North Korean incident that have never been adequately addressed (a full copy of the letter can be found in Appendix 6):

- Current United States policy is not effectively addressing the threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their proliferation.
- United States assistance sustains a repressive and authoritarian regime, and is not effectively monitored.
- Current United States policy does not effectively address the issues posed by international criminal activity of the North Korean government, such as narcotics trafficking, support for international terrorism and counterfeiting.
- Current United States policy does not effectively advance internationally recognized standards of human rights in North Korea, including liberating political prisoners and abolishing prisons for hungry children.
- Current United States policy does not effectively encourage the political and economic liberalization of North Korea.

The final report to congress in 1999 on the Yongbyon facilities included the following ominous statement:

The fate of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 25-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon that are being stored in canisters remains unresolved. The 1994 Agreed Framework prohibits reprocessing of the fuel rods, but does not specify where they ultimately will be disposed. The rods contain about 25-30 kilograms of plutonium; enough for four to five bombs if North Korea decides to take action to reprocess them.⁸⁹

Under the threat of ‘war,’ the NPT issue was less serious than the threat of tens of thousands of American casualties and hundreds of Korean casualties, not to mention the estimated \$ 60 Billion it would cost.⁹⁰

Former President Carter brokered a diplomatic solution to the crisis that is reminiscent of the numerous compromises after Versailles. The agreement committed the DPRK to allow the IAEA inspectors at the LWR sites so long as good faith efforts are ongoing between the United States and DPRK. The deal was actually a compromise, “in return for Western help, Pyongyang would agree to negotiate with Washington but not IAEA.”⁹¹

The threat of nuclear proliferation was indeed a great diplomatic investment for the DPRK. In just a few months, North Korea accomplished a diplomatic coup. At little or no costs they became the focus of international attention and obtained major concessions from the United States for modern nuclear technology. Additionally, they received the promise of major trade benefits, fuel delivery and long-term diplomatic relations. The IAEA, North Korea’s only nemesis and true threat, was eliminated from the diplomatic equation. Further developments after 1994 would prove that in the event of DPRKs development of long rang ballistic missile capabilities, North Korea would receive more concessions.

The United States experience in this Korean crisis makes it clear, as Great Britain learned almost a century ago, there is no substitute for a strong military. A strong armed force that can overwhelm and reinforce makes the thought of “nuclear blackmail,” unthinkable. By

1994, United States military ground forces already reduced to 525,000 had nullified the ability to rapidly engage in Korea. Today, American ground forces (Army and Marines) are at the lowest levels since pre-World War II. Does anyone think it probable that a major contingency operation in North Korea would not encourage further action by the Iraqi's or other rogue nations? Considered with the significant ground force commitment in the Balkans, it is almost a guarantee.

DIFFERENCES IN THE ANALOGY

Great Britain after WWI, faced massive financial challenges that resulted from the global war. Investment gradually migrated from England to Japan and the United States in the post-WWI era exasperating the problems of a worldwide economic depression, unemployment and the strong political pressure for domestic spending. The financial effort required for Great Britain in the post post-WWI era to maintain their military strength at levels demanded by the Empire would have been Herculean. The gold supply mentioned earlier, foreign investment and economic decline of the British economy all were detrimental to Great Britain maintaining her armed forces strong enough to provide for the Empire. The investment needed for global engagement would have been an overbearing domestic challenge. Britain in the 1920s also had to endure the emotional impact of the recent world war. This “recent calamity” syndrome made it almost impossible for Britain's leading political and military leaders to implement a global engagement policy. Political leadership, who legitimately wished to make England a nation ‘fit for heroes’, consistently ignored military problems until the mid-1930s when it was too late to remedy the deteriorated state of her Armed Forces.

America on the other hand, is a nation enjoying the most powerful economic prosperity in the history of the world. In 1999, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States is larger than the world's ninety smallest nations added together. During the 1996-99 economic crisis, which devastated many Pacific Rim and other nations, the United States' economy arguably flew the global economic airplane on her one powerful engine. Today, the United States Congress and Administration are not talking about five-year tax cut plan; the tax-cut issue is a *fait accompli*. At the time of this writing, debate now centers on how many trillions of dollars that will be involved in the final tax cut. The United States economy could easily, by comparison with Great Britain in the 1920s, endure the military forces needed to support a realistic global engagement foreign policy.

Another significant difference is the geographic isolation enjoyed by the United States. Great Britain on the other hand, has always been dominated by Europe as noted by British historian, Correlli Barnett in, *The Collapse of British Power*:

"From the cliffs of Dover on a clear day it is possible to see a gray rim of land shutting in the south-eastern horizon. It is not the coastline of Asia; nor of Japan; nor of Arabia, Africa or Asia Minor, but of Europe. England lies only twenty-two miles from the European shore. Simple, obvious, indeed well known a fact as this was, the English were prone from time to time to forget all the implication which it bore for English policy and strategy. ⁹²

While isolated by the sea and dominated by Europe, Britain's Imperial boarders were not secure and required sufficient armed forces to secure and shape the global economic and security environment throughout the Empire. Unlike Great Britain, the United States enjoys two secure boarders to the North and South. She has thousands of miles of ocean to isolate Her from potential rogue nations. This isolation enjoyed by the United States affords an advantage

in international foreign policy and homeland security that did not exist for Great Britain. Increasingly, technology is offsetting the advantage of isolation. Another significant difference between Great Britain and the United States the fact that Great Britain, in the years after WWI enjoyed having the United States as an ally. Even in the post WWI era, the industrial and populations of the United States, a similar Western democracy with many parallel global interests, provided a failsafe that could turn the tide in World War II. No such advantage exists for the United States today.

The final difference in the analogy is found in technology, which can be a two edged sword. The German threat posed to Great Britain in the 1920s hardly seemed significant considering the economic and military disaster of WWI. Today, the United States hardly considers a threat from North Korea or Iraq as legitimate when taken in the context of a narrow view that focuses on ‘reaction’ to threats against our people or homeland. However, the United States vital, global interests must be broader than merely being a reactive player in the global community. As the world’s ‘indispensable nation’ the United States must consider the global economic trade, world politics and allies’ interests when considering threats to American interests. Nuclear proliferation in North Korea coupled with the 1998 intermediate-range testing of No Dong III missile technology presents a threat to the political and economic stability of the Pacific Rim. The No Dong III missile testing demonstrated that it can reach the state of Hawaii. Pacific Rim nations comprise about one third of the total United States foreign trade—clearly a vital national interest. While the DPRK assures the west that they are abiding by the provisions of the 1994 “Agreed Framework,” their record of accomplishment does not elicit much confidence. At this writing, the DPRK is again threatening to withdraw from the NPT.

Additionally, no UN inspectors have set foot in Iraq for five years. Recent diplomatic efforts by the Secretary of State, General (Ret.) Colin Powell indicates that the United States is considering a policy of limited lifting of UN sanctions in Iraq. The chemical, biological and nuclear programs have gone unchecked for years by a tyrant whose record stands as a testimony of deceit, lies and broken promises.

Chapter 4 Conclusion:

“Only the dead, have seen the end of war,” Plato.

America's military, economic and diplomatic situation in 1991 resembled Great Britain's in 1919. Like the British after WWI, rather than reduce global commitments, the end of the cold war saw an increase in a number of small interests many that would demand the use of military force. The general expectation that the collapse of the Soviet Union would entitle a *quid pro quo* “peace dividend” and a relaxation in foreign affairs and a strong military engagement policy was and still is, dangerously wrong. It is vital that the United States maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, Pacific Rim, Europe and globally in places wherever economic and allied interests are found. Foreign policy however, cannot be reactive, it must shape the ‘brave new world’ through a balanced approach to economic, diplomatic and informational activities. Most importantly, as the British learned almost a century ago, a strong military capability and the will power to use force to engage the international environment must back foreign policy. While Great Britain's *oderint dum metuant* policy of the 19th Century may be too draconian for the democratic United States in the 21st Century, Britain's minimum force of a heavy hand with restraint holds significant value. The collapse of the Soviet Union destabilized many regions in the world. Former Soviet client states, like Iraq, were free to exercise regional attempts for hegemony. The Persian Gulf War ensued. In the Caucasus, horrific and violent warfare, anarchy and ethnic cleansing engulfed the region. The Caucasus containing 40 percent of the world's natural gas and 70 percent of the world's known oil reserves endured over 100,000 dead and 1.25 million refugees since 1990.⁹³ No region of

the now defunct Soviet Union equaled the Caucasus in demonstrating how ‘bloody and messy’ the death of a large empire can be.⁹⁴ In Eastern Europe, nationalistic tendencies and racial hatred which was long dormant under the iron rule of the USSR now emerged in states such as Yugoslavia, with a brutal and destabilizing regional impact.⁹⁵ China was free from the long-term massive military concern on her northern border. North Korea, deprived of Soviet military, economic and political support after the Cold War, turned to nuclear and missile technology.⁹⁶ The self-balancing, bipolar-sphere of United States versus USSR global politics, exploded into many controversial and unstable regions.⁹⁷ In the near-term, as demonstrated by Great Britain almost a century before, the United States would need a much more active foreign policy. This monograph demonstrates, a strong, well-trained and modernized military force to back the multitude of United States strategic interests cannot be substituted by wishful thinking, treaties, the promise of technology or a new-age Ten Year Rule. The time to engage and shape the future global geopolitical environment is now.

Appendix 1

Summary of war casualties

This is a summary of the war casualties suffered by the British army, by theatre from 4th August 1914 to 30th September 1918.

Theatre	<i>Killed in action died from wounds died from other causes</i>	Wounded	<i>Missing, including prisoners</i>
France	510,821	1,523,332	236,573
Italy	2,071	4,689	344
Dardanelles	18,688	47,128	7,525
Saonika	9,668	16,837	2,778
Mesopotamia	15,230	19,449	3,581
Egypt	14,763	29,434	2,951
East Africa	1,269	534	62
Afghanistan	120	152	2
North Russia and Vladivostok	359	453	143
Other Theatres	508	461	217
Totals	573,497	1,642,469	254,176

Note: Figures taken from *Britain and the First World War; Edited by John Turner. ISBN 0044451091.*
Published by Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1988.

Appendix 2

Key Provisions of the Versailles Treaty ⁹⁸

- The population and territory of Germany was reduced by 10 percent.
- Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France.
- The Saarland region was placed under the supervision of the League of Nations until 1935.
- Three small northern German areas were given to Belgium.
- Northern Schleswig was returned to Denmark from Germany.
- The Polish borders were withdrawn, West Prussia and a corridor to the Baltic were added and part of Upper Silesia.
- Austria-Hungary was taken apart, reforming as independent countries, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929), Austria and Hungary.
- Danzig was declared a free city, independent of any nation.
- Germany overseas colonies were given over to Allied nations.
- Germany was compelled to sign and acknowledge a humiliating war guilt clause, which made the country liable for all reparations to the Allied nations.
- Kaiser Wilhelm II was accused of war crimes and guaranteed a fair trial and the right was reserved to bring others to trial. No trials took place for War Crimes, Wilhelm fled to Holland who declined to extradite him.
- The Germany army was limited to a 100,000 Army and its general staff abolished.
- The production of weapons of war was either prohibited (as in the case of tanks, poison gas, airplanes, submarines) or severely curtailed.
- The Rhineland was declared a demilitarized zone and the occupation lasted into the late 1920s.
- Massive financial reparations to be determined in 1921 by committee, until determined Germany would pay \$ 5 billion, due 1 May 1921.

Author's note: in 1921, the Reparations Committee determined that Germany should pay a total of \$ 32 ½ billion by 1963.

Appendix 3

PRESIDENT WILSON: FOURTEEN POINTS ⁹⁹

- I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
- II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
- III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
- IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
- V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
- VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
- VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

- VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
- IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
- X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.
- XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.
- XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
- XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
- XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

Appendix 4

UN Security Council Resolution 687 (Demands on Iraq), 8 April 1991

1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

A

2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;

3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

B

5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

C

7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:

- (i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
- (ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
- (iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;

11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

D

15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

E

16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;

F

20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;
22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;
23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;
24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
 - (a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
 - (b) Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
 - (c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
 - (d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses or any other arrangements;

26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;
27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;
28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;
29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

G

30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;
31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

H

32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

I

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

Appendix 5

Iraqi Challenges to Coalition ¹⁰⁰

August 1990: Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. Within two weeks, the U.S. Army has deployed a battalion of 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers to Saudi Arabia, the first of what would become a more than 500,000-strong force in the region in what becomes known as Operation Desert Shield.

January 1991: With Iraq refusing United Nations demands to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States and a massive international military coalition launch Operation Desert Storm, a six-week air campaign followed by a 100-day ground war that ends with Iraq defeated on Feb. 28.

April 1991: Saddam Hussein crushes a Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. Thousands of refugees flee to Turkey and the U.S. military responds with a massive relief operation dubbed Provide Comfort.

August 1992: Iraq challenges coalition warplanes that are for the first time enforcing the southern no-fly zone. The United States responds by dispatching a contingent of 1st Cavalry soldiers to Kuwait falling in on pre-positioned war stocks there.

January 1993: Iraqi troops surge along their southern border with Kuwait and the 1st Cavalry division again responds with a brigade of troops on land, backed by an aircraft carrier battle group off the coast. For the first time since the war, warships in the Gulf launch cruise missiles at targets in Iraq.

June 1993: Another salvo of Tomahawk missiles is launched against Iraq after U.S. intelligence confirms Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate former President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait earlier in the year.

October 1994: Iraq again masses troops, including two divisions of Republican Guards, along the Kuwaiti border. Under what becomes known as Operation Vigilant Warrior, the United States responds by deploying a heavy brigade from the 24th Infantry Division, an aircraft carrier and Air Force strike fighters into the region.

September 1995: Detecting signs of another Iraqi muster, the United States launches Operation Vigilant Sentinel, again pouring thousands of troops into Kuwait and extending an aircraft carrier's tour in the gulf.

October 1996: With Saddam Hussein making incursions into Kurdish camps to the north, the United States sends a barrage of cruise missiles into the south in what is called Operation Desert Strike. An aircraft carrier, a brigade of 1st Cavalry Division soldiers and Air Force strike fighters also reinforce troops already in the region until tensions cool.

February 1997: This time called Operation Desert Thunder, the United States goes to a war footing again around Iraq as tensions skyrocket over weapons inspections. With United Nations and Arab neighbors strongly condemning would-be air strikes, Operation Desert Lightning is called off.

December 1998: Iraq refuses to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to key facilities. The United States launches Operation Desert Fox — three days of air and cruise missile strikes — as a brigade of 3rd Infantry Division troops deploys from Fort Stewart, Ga., to the Iraqi border, supported by an aircraft carrier and Air Force warplanes.

Since Desert Fox, the United States has decided to keep the pressure on Iraq through a low-level air war that has seen strikes on a weekly basis. In fact, strikes have become so routine that most barely garner a mention in newspapers and broadcasts.

2000-2001: In the last year alone, there have been a total of 77 air strikes split evenly between the northern and southern no-fly zones. That is more than six, every month.

Author's Note: at this writing, USAF and RAF warplanes are again, attacking Iraqi air defense targets.

Appendix 6¹⁰¹

Congress of the United States

October 29, 1999

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

We are pleased to transmit to you our report, which answers the question: Does North Korea pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than it did five years ago? In sum, we found that the comprehensive threat posed by North Korea to our national security has increased since 1994. Our report contains an executive summary.

We were not asked to make specific recommendations as part of our report, and remained within the confines of our mandate. It is our unanimous view, however, that the findings of our report identify a number of serious weaknesses concerning current U.S. policy toward North Korea that urgently require the attention of the foreign policy and national security committees of Congress. We strongly suggest that you direct the relevant committees to review the following issues and report back to you with their specific legislation for congressional action by a date certain.

Among the issues that need to be addressed are the following:

- Current U.S. policy is not effectively addressing the threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their proliferation.
- U.S. assistance sustains a repressive and authoritarian regime, and is not effectively monitored.
- Current U.S. policy does not effectively address the issues posed by international criminal activity of the North Korean government, such as narcotics trafficking, support for international terrorism and counterfeiting.
- Current U.S. policy does not effectively advance internationally-recognized standards of human rights in North Korea, including liberating political prisoners and abolishing prisons for hungry children.
- Current U.S. policy does not effectively encourage the political and economic liberalization of North Korea.

We believe that our report is an important first step in addressing these issues, and we look forward to working with you and the relevant committees.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman

Appendix 7: Center for Defense Information, List of DoD web sites on foreign policy, and related issues.

►

DEFENSE and FOREIGN POLICY

[Alternatives to Military Intervention](#)
[Asian Military Situation](#)
[Cuba](#)
[Indonesia](#)
[Iraq](#)

MILITARY FORCES and STRATEGY

[Aviation](#)
[Biological and Chemical Warfare](#)
[National Guard and Reserves Forces](#)
[Naval Power and Strategy](#)
[Quadrennial Defense Review \(QDR\)](#)
[National Security Study Group](#)
[Space/Ballistic Missile Defenses](#)
[Women in the Military](#)
[World at War](#)

ARMS TRADE ISSUES

[The Arms Trade](#)
[CDI's Arms Transfer Project](#)
[Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[Landmines](#)
[Small Arms and Light Weapons](#)

EUROPEAN ISSUES

[European Defense](#)
[Balkan Conflicts](#)
[Caucasus Conflicts](#)

NUCLEAR ISSUES

[CDI Goals for US Nuclear Weapons](#)
[CDI Nuclear Weapons Database](#)
[Nuclear Facts and Figures](#)
[Arms Control Issues](#)
[Nuclear Proliferation](#)
[Nuclear Testing](#)
[Fissile Material](#)

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

[Peacekeeping Citation List](#)
[United Nations Issues](#)

MILITARY SPENDING

[U.S. Military Spending](#)
[World Military Expenditures](#)
[Military Industrial Complex](#)
[Base Closures and Realignments](#)

Note: Digital copy of monograph contains the WWW link to each site. See web site at:
<http://www.cdi.org/issues/>, for more information.

Appendix 8: List of Abbreviations

BUR	Bottom Up Review
CAB	Cabinet Office
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officer's Course
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CP	Cabinet Office Papers
COL	Colonel
DoD	Department of Defense
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
GI	Government Issue (soldier in this monograph)
IACC	Inter-Allied Control Commission
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IO	India Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEN	General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C	General Officer Commanding in Chief

HRSO	His/Her Majesty Stationary Office
JV	Joint Vision
LWR	Light Water Reactor
MMAS	Master of Military Arts and Science
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NAZI	National Socialist Fascist Party
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
OSD	Office, Secretary of Defense
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
Ph.D.	Doctor of Philosophy
PM	Prime Minister
RAF	Royal Air Force
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RUSI	Royal United Service Institution
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPI	United Press, International
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WO	War Office and War Office Papers
WP	War Paper
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aldcroft, Derek H. *From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1977.

Barnett, Correlli. *Engage the Enemy More Closely*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991.

_____. *The Collapse of British Power*. London: Brassey's Inc., 1972.

_____. *The Lost Victory*. London: Macmillan Press, 1995.

Beloff, Max. *Imperial Sunset - Britain's Liberal Empire, 1987-1921, Volume 1*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House Inc., 1970.

Burg, Steven L. and Paul Shoup. *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999.

Bond, Brian. *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

Charmley, John. *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1989.

Clayton, Anthony. *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Curran, Joseph M. *The Birth of the Irish Free State, 1921-1923*. Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1981.

Ecclesiastes 1:9, The Holy Bible. New York: NIV Translation by International Bible Studies Group, 1984.

Fuller, J.F.C. *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1961.

_____. *The Reformation of War*. Oxford: Hutchinson Printing, Inc., 1923.

Gibbs, N.H. *Grand Strategy, Volume I*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1976.

Haldane, Sir Aylmer. *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, Limited, 1922.

Heller, Charles E. and William A. Stofft. *America's First Battles, 1776 – 1965*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.

Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1961.

Jeffery, Keith. *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-1922*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.

Johnson, F.A.. *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Judah, Tim. *Kosovo, War and Revenge*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000.

Kagan, Donald and Fredrick W. Kagan. *While America Sleeps*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Kaplan, Robert D. *Eastward to Tartary*. New York: Random House,, Inc., 2000.

Keegan, John. *Six Armies in Normandy*. London: Jonathan Cape Company, 1982.

Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1987.

_____. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. New York: Humanity Books, 1996.

Keynes, John M. *Economic Consequences of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt Press, 1920.

Lippmann, Walter. *The Cold War*. Boston: The Atlantic Press, 1947.

Lucas, Sir Charles (ed.). *The Empire at War, Volume 1 of V*. London: Royal Colonial Institute, 1921-1926.

Manchester, William. *The Last Lion – Winston Spencer Churchill, Visions of Glory 1874 - 1932*. New York: Dell Publishing Co, Inc., 1983.

Microsoft ® Encarta. *Paris Peace Conference Photo*. New York: Funk & Wagnall's Corporation, 1994.

Moore, R. J. *The Crisis of Indian Unity from 1917-1940*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

Nicholson, Harold. *Curzon: the Last Pause 1919-1925*. Edinburg: Constable & Sons Printing Inc., 1934.

Nicholson, Harold. *King George V*. Edinburg: Constable & Sons Printing Inc., 1952.

Oberdorfer, Donald. *The Two Koreas, A Contemporary History*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Inc., 1997.

Orde, Anne. *Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926*. London: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1978.

Powell, Colin. *My American Journey*. New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1995.

Ritter, Scott. *Endgame: Solving the Iraqi Problem – Once and for All*. New York: MacMillan Press, 1999.

Roskill, Stephen W. *Hankey: Man of Secrets* Glasgow: Harper/Collins, 1972.

Roskill, Steven W. *Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume 1- The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919 - 1929*. New York: Walker Publishing Company, 1968.

Santayana, George. *Fields of Gold*. Norwalk: C.R. Gibson Company, 1983.

Schiff, Victor. *Germany at Versailles, 1919*. New York: The Sycamore School, 1995.

Silverman, D. P. *Reconstructing Europe After the Great War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Strange, Joe. *A Case for Strategic Principles of War*. Quantico: The Marine Corps University, 1998.

Trachtenberg, M. *Preparation in World Politics: France and European Diplomacy 1916-192*. New York: Random House Pub. Inc., 1980.

Turner, John. *Britain and the First World War*; New York: Routledge. 1988.

Whaley, Barton. *Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misrepresentation*. Fredrick, MD: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Wilson, Sir Arnold. *Mesopotamia, 1917-1920; a Clash of Loyalties*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931

Woodward, David R. *Lloyd George and the Generals*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983.

Wurmser, David. *Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein*. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1999.

Articles

Anderson, Jon R., "GIs react frequently to Iraqi Flare-ups," *European Stars and Stripes*, 28 Feb 2001.

Cable News Network Report, "Carter Says North Korea Won't Expel Nuclear Inspectors," *CNN*, 16 June 1994.

Crawley, Vince, "Review Shaped Today's Military," *Army Times*, 5 Mar 2001.

Helprin, Mark, "The New American." *Hudson Institute*, 17 Aug 89.

Shaw, George Bernard, "Quotable Quotes." *Readers Digest*, Nov 1942.

Reports, Papers and Monographs

Aspin, Les, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the post-Soviet Era*. House Armed Services Committee Paper, 24 Jan 1992.

Aspin, Les, *An approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options*. House Armed Services Committee Paper, 25 Jan 1992.

Aspin, Les, *Understanding the New Security Environment*. An Address to the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 Jan 1992.

Aspin, Les. *Report on the Bottom Up Review by Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense*," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., October, 1993.

Chaney, Richard B., Secretary of Defense, Powell, Colin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and Atwood, Donald J., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defence; *Defense Department Budget Briefing*, Washington D.C., 19 Jan 1992.

Davis, Paul K. and Kugler, Richard L., *New Principles for Force Sizing*. Found in Khalizad, Zalmay M. and Ochmanek, David A., *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century*. Santa Monica: University of California Press, 1997.

Hankey, Sir Maurice, *Hankey Diary (HNKY 1/5)*. Cambridge: Churchill College, 1930.

Kemp, Geoffrey and Harkavy, Robert E., *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution Press, 1997.

Mazarr, Michael J. *North Korea and the Bomb; A Case Study in Nonproliferation*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1996.

Spence, Congressman Floyd, *U.S. National Security Panel Discussion, Insight on News*. New York: The Gale Group, News World Communications, Inc, 1998.

Winfeld, James A., *The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors and Disconnects*. Santa Monica: University of California Press, 1992.

Government Publications, Joint and International Publications

Documents of British Foreign Policy, First Series, Vol. XXVII, 1925, No. 592, *Summary Report on Notes*, 4 Jun 1925.

Department of Defense: *Fiscal Year 2000, Annual Report to the President and Congress*. Washington D.C., Jan 2000.

Department of Defense: *Fiscal Year 1991, Annual Report to the President and Congress*. Washington D.C., Jan 1991.

Government Accounting Office, *Bottom Up Review: Analysis of Key DoD Assumptions*. GAO/NSAID 95-56, Washington D.C., 1995.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, *Joint Chiefs of Staff Releases, Joint Vision - 2020*. News Release No. 294-00, Washington D.C., 30 May 2000.

United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Papers, Public Record Office, "Minutes and Conclusions of Cabinet Meetings and Conferences of Ministers," 17 Nov 1920.

United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Papers, Public Record Office, “Minutes and Conclusions of Cabinet Meetings and Conferences of Ministers,” *Memorandum to the German Minister of Defence on the Mainentance of an Army of 200,000*, 20 Apr 1920, CAB 24/103.

United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Papers, Public Record Office, “Minutes and Conclusions of Cabinet Meetings and Conferences of Ministers,” 19 Sep 1922.

United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Papers, Public Record Office: Cabinet Paper # 1884, *Record of Cabinet Meeting 24/111*, 2 Sep 1920.

United Kingdom, War Office Paper, Public Record Office, “Minutes and conclusions of the Committee on the Organization of the After War Army.” *Working Paper # A2277 of 1919*, 28 Feb 1919.

United Nations Special Commission. *Eighth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687*, 1991, on the activities of the Special Commission, UN Document S/1994/1422, 15 Dec 1994.

United Nations Special Commission. *Ninth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687*, 1991, on the activities of the Special Commission, UN Document S/1995/864, 11 Oct 1995.

World Wide Web Internet Sites

http://www.house.gov/international_relations/nkag/report.htm

<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2001/s20010301gis.htm>

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/menu.htm>

<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html>

<http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm>

<http://www.cdi.org/issues/>

<http://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html>

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1571/n36_v14/21161637/print.jhtml

Endnotes:

¹ Other historical examples include; the United States after WW II and events leading to the Korean War and experiences with Task Force Smith; the United States from 1919-1939, a case study of events leading up to battle of Kasserine Pass; Israel and events leading to the 1973 Yom Kippur War; France and events leading to the Franco – Prussian War; and Great Britain, the fall of British Naval Power between 1919 and 1939; as well as numerous others. This study however, focuses exclusively on Great Britain after World War 1 and parallels to the United States in the post-Cold War era. The author, inspired by Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D., SAMS to consider all of these historical examples, due to time and length constraints of the SAMS monograph guidance, decided to examine Great Britain in the post-WWI era.

² George Santayana, *Fields of Gold*, Ed. Priscilla Shepard (Norwalk: CR Gibson Co., 1983), pg. 31.

³ Anthony Clayton, *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986), page 2.

⁴ Brian Bond, *British Policy between the Two World Wars*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pg. 3.

⁵ Dame Veronica Wedgwood, as quoted in *The Two Koreas*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1997) xv.

⁶ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, 1987) page 228. Kennedy provides a detailed report on Great Britain's erosion of industrial and commercial preeminence in the global market. The economic decline before WWI and the loss of gold reserves as a result of the war had a negative impact on Great Britain's military. Also see Correlli Barnett, *Engage the Enemy more Closely* for an in depth review of how Britain's economic decline directly influenced the Royal Navy.

⁷ Kennedy, *ibid.*, page 256.

⁸ Max Beloff, *Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 Imperial Sunset, Volume I*, (1969), pp. 278, 348. Beloff provides an in-depth discussion of Britain's decline as a great power after and in part of WW I. Also, see Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, (New York: Humanity Books, 1996), Chapters 9 & 10 for an in-depth discussion the budgets cuts had on the British Navy.

⁹ Keith Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922*, (Manchester: University Press, 1984), page 13.

¹⁰ Sir Charles Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War, Volume I*, page v, (Royal Colonial Institute, 1921-1926) these numbers are drawn from this volume as quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.* Page 20.

¹¹ Keith Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 13.

¹² Hankey to Balfour (copy to Sir Henry Wilson, Nov 1920, Wilson MSS. 6/42c, as quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 52.

¹³ John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982).

¹⁴ Sir Aylmer Haldane, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, pg. 73 as referenced in Keith Jeffrey's *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire*, *ibid.*, page 150.

¹⁵ Estimate by GHQ Baghdad of troops available on 1 Jul 1920, quoted in IO to FO, 3 Sept 1920, Haldane, page 64 quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 150.

¹⁶ Wilson to IO, 9 Jul 1920; to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, 26 Jul as noted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 150.

¹⁷ Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 151.

¹⁸ Donald and Fredrick W. Kagan, *While America Sleeps*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) page 51. Estimate taken from "Army Estimates, 1920-21, Conclusions of a meeting of the British Cabinet Finance Committee held on 9 Feb 1920," CAB 24/98, page 215.

¹⁹ Jeffery, *ibid.*, Map of the Middle East during the post-World War I era, page 34.

²⁰ Bond, *ibid.*, page 16.

²¹ Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Pause 1919-1925*, (Boston and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1934) as quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 73.

²² Kagan, *ibid.*, page 75.

²³ Nicholson, *idid.*, page 270.

²⁴ Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 154.

²⁵ Lloyd George, MSS. F/209/2. Telegrams were sent to Australia, Canada, Newfoundland (which supported but had no troops), New Zealand and South Africa. As quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 44.

²⁶ Cabinet minutes, 17 November 1920, CAB 23/23/61 as quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 48.

²⁷ See Appendix 1 for a summary of Great Britain's Army World War One casualties.

²⁸ William Manchester, *The Last Lion, Winston Churchill, Visions of Glory*, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, page 677). Manchester's Chapter 5, Oxbow, pages 655-695 illustrate a vociferous hatred of the fledgling Soviet Union and a numerous very colorful speeches, quotes and details of Churchill's contempt for the "Reds."

²⁹ Bond, *Ibid.*, page 16.

³⁰ The San Remo Conference in April 1920 confirmed secret wartime arrangements by allocating Mesopotamia and Palestine to Britain and Syria and Lebanon to France as mandates. Bond, *Ibid.*, page 15.

³¹ Bond, *ibid.*, page 18.

³² The term 'Irish ulcer' is taken from Jeffery, *ibid.*, Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the impact occupation of Ireland had on the British Army from 1919-1922,

³³ Harold Nicholson, *King George V*, (London: Constable Printing), 1952 as quoted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 75.

³⁴ Joseph M. Curran, *The Birth of the Irish Free State, 1921-1923*, (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1980). Curran's book provides a detailed discussion of the peace negotiations and debates in the D'ail that led to the Irish constitution, plebiscite and ensuing civil war.

³⁵ N.H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy, vol. i, Appendix I*, HMSO, 1976 contains a discussion regarding the question of Irish naval bases.

³⁶ R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1974.

³⁷ See Bond, *ibid.*, pages 98-126 (Chap. 4) for a detailed view of the British Army in India and the Cardwell system.

³⁸ Telegram from Viceroy, Army Dept to Secretary of State for India, 3 Sep 1920, CP 1884, CAB 24/111, p 424 as quoted in Kagan & Kagan, *ibid.*, see page 60 for the complete telegram.

³⁹ Bond, *Ibid.*, see pages 20-22 for a concise overview of the domestic incidents in Great Britain after WWI.

⁴⁰ Joe Strange, Ph.D., *A Case for Strategic Principles of War*, (Quantico: The Marine Corps University, 1998), page 92.

⁴¹ War Office Paper, WO A2277 of 1919, Committee on the Organization of the After War Army, as noted in Jeffery, *ibid.*, page 23.

⁴² See Gibbs, N.H., *Grand Strategy*, i. 3-6. Steven Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, I, 214-215, F.A. Johnson, *Defense by Committee*, (1960) pages 198-200.

⁴³ Bond, *ibid.*, page 25.

⁴⁴ "Probably originator of the Ten Year Rule" is taken from Hankey's biographer, Stephen Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, vol. II, 1972, page 112 and 'The Ten Year Rule—the Historical Facts' in RUSI Journal (March 1972) as quoted in Bond, *ibid.*, page 25.

⁴⁵ Bond, *Ibid.*, page 26.

⁴⁶ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War*, Hutchinson, 1923.

⁴⁷ Bond, *ibid.*, page 97.

⁴⁸ President Woodrow Wilson, "Fourteen Points in President Wilson's Congressional Address delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918." See Appendix 3 for a list of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points. For full text copy of President Wilson's address to congress available from <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html>; Internet; accessed 27 Feb 2001.

⁴⁹ Paris Peace Conference Photo," Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright (c) 1994 Microsoft Corporation. Copyright (c) 1994 Funk & Wagnall's Corporation.

⁵⁰ John M. Keynes, *Economic Consequences of the Peace*. (New York: Harcourt Press), 1920, page 169.

⁵¹ Manchester, *ibid.*, page 661-669. Note: see Chapter 7, Oxbow for a detailed background account of Winston S. Churchill and his views towards the Treaty of Versailles and Germany in the post WWI era.

⁵² Manchester, *ibid.*, page 669.

⁵³ Post World War I diplomatic conferences and treaties are myriad i.e., Locarno, Lucerne, Spa, Washington, Versailles, etc. to name a few.

⁵⁴ Anne Orde, *Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926*. (London, 1978), page 82.

⁵⁵ For detailed account of the economic impact of Versailles and post WWI Germany see: Victor Schiff, *Germany at Versailles, 1919*, (New York: The Sycamore School:1995); M Trachtenberg, *Preparation in*

World Politics: France and European Diplomacy 1916-1923 (New York: 1980); D. P Silverman, *Reconstructing Europe After the Great War* (Cambridge, Mass: 1982). For a good summary of all post-1919 economic studies see, D.H. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919-1929* (London: 1977), page 13.

The economic influence on Germany, while of great importance, is beyond the scope of this monograph.

⁵⁶ Memorandum to the German Minister of Defence on the Maintenance of an Army of 200,000, 20 April 1920, CAB 24/103, pp. 116 and 117, as quoted in Kagan, *ibid.*, page 147.

⁵⁷ “Note presented by British, French Italian Japanese and Belgian Ambassadors at Berlin”, 4 Jun 1925, Cmd. 2429. For report summary see *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, First Series, vol. XXVII, 1925, No. 592.

⁵⁸ Barton Whaley, *Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misrepresentation*: (Fredrick, Maryland, 1984) as quoted in Kagan, page 155.

⁵⁹ Kagan, *ibid.*, page 158.

⁶⁰ Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, (London: 1972).

⁶¹ Kagan, *Ibid.*, page 233.

⁶² Ecclesiastes 1:9 NIV (New International Version) Holy Bible.

⁶³ American journalist Walter Lippmann first popularized the term *cold war* in a 1947 book by that name. By using the term, Lippmann meant to suggest that relations between the USSR and its World War II allies (primarily the United States, Britain, and France) had deteriorated to the point of war without the occurrence of actual warfare.

⁶⁴ Fiscal year Department of Defense outlays, from DoD, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 2000.

⁶⁵ Mark Helprin, “The New American,” (Hudson Institute, 17 Aug 89) page 19.

⁶⁶ Note: DoD, the services and a number of writers often claim the number of named contingency operations have increased 3-4 times since 1989. Missing from a broad view of named contingencies is the analysis of the size, duration and complexity of the operations. There is danger in DoD agencies assigning names to insignificant portions of major deployments as it smacks of “stacking” the books for political or other influence. Regardless of the questionable value in a “named operations” type measurement, no one on active duty, would argue that the operational tempo has not dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War.

⁶⁷ Congressman Floyd Spence, “US National Security panel discussion, Insight on News.” *The Gale Group, News World Communications, Inc.*; 28 Sep 1998; available from http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1571/n36_v14/21161637/print.jhtml; Internet; accessed 22 Feb 2001.

⁶⁸ Author’s note: The 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions was arguably, a major defense review. It is not covered in this monograph to maintain the SAMS format length. Additionally, the result of the 1995 report on Roles and Missions concludes that, similar to the 1997 QDR recommendations, the U.S. should be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

⁶⁹ General (Ret.) Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, (New York: 1995), page 437

⁷⁰ Powell, *ibid.*, page 436. Note: Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992* (Washington D.C.:1993) contains additional details of The Base Force and important contributors to the concept.

⁷¹ Richard Chaney, *Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1991*. (Washington D. C., 1991), page 131.

⁷² Les Aspin, “Understanding the New Security Environment,” an address to the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992. For a detailed review of the Bottom Up Review see also: Les Aspin, “An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era,” House Armed Services Committee Paper, 24 Jan 1992 and “An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options,” House Armed Services Committee Paper, 25 Feb 1992

⁷³ Defense Department Budget Briefing by Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Donald J. Atwood, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 19 January 1992.

⁷⁴ The BUR results were controversial because it explained the need for a 2-MRC capability but did not provide the capabilities. The concept of “nearly simultaneous” ability to conduct 2-MRCs was high-risk even under the most optimistic conditions. Details of these assumptions are provided in publication:

United States Government Accounting Office, *Bottom Up Review: Analysis of Key DoD Assumptions*, GOA/NSAID-95-56, Washington, D.C. 1995, page 5.

⁷⁵ See the following studies for justification and recommendations of the 2-MRC force capability. James A. Winnefeld, *The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors and Disconnects*. (Santa Monica, University of California Press) 1992 and Paul K. Davis and Richard L. Kugler, "New Principles for Force Sizing," in Zalmay M. Khalizad and David A. Ochmanek, eds., *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century*. (Santa Monica: University of California Press) 1997, page 97.

⁷⁶ The author contends that billions has been spent on R&D efforts by all the services fielding numerous minor systems and items of equipment. However, not one major DoD program (ACAT 1) has moved to full-scale production between 1993 and 2000: a paradox yet virtual, standstill!

⁷⁷ Vince Crawley, "Review Shaped Today's Military," *Army Times*, 5 Mar 2001.

⁷⁸ Center for Defense Information available from <http://www.cdi.org/Issues/>; Internet; accessed 4 Mar 2001.

⁷⁹ Office of the Asst. Sec. of Defense, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman releases, 'Joint Vision' 2020", News Release No. 294-00, (Washington D. C.) 30 May 2000.

⁸⁰ Kagan & Kagan, *ibid.*, page 430.

⁸¹ UN Security Council Resolution 687, 8 April 91. Full copy of UNSCR 687 is at Appendix 4; additional information available from <http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm>; Internet; accessed on 1 Mar 2001.

⁸² Jon R. Anderson, "GIs react frequently to Iraqi flare-ups," *European Stars and Stripes*, 28 Feb 2001.

⁸³ See the following for a detailed description of Iraqi efforts to stall, intimidate and conceal violations of the UNSCOM inspection efforts. David Wurmser, *America's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein* (Washington, D.C., 1999) page 11 and Scott Ritter, *Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem—Once and for All* (New York: MacMillan Press) 1999. See also, UNSCOM Report of 11 October 1995, UN Document S/1995/864.

⁸⁴ UNSCOM Report of 11 October 1995, UN Document S/1995/864.

⁸⁵ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Korea, a Contemporary History*. (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1997) page 305. See also: Michael J. Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York, 1996). This case study provides an excellent background and detailed account of the 1994 nuclear confrontation between the United States and North Korea.

⁸⁶ Mazarr, *ibid.*, pages 94-95.

⁸⁷ Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, page 286.

⁸⁸ Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, 288.

⁸⁹ Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, North Korea Advisory Group and Chairman, Committee on International Relations, "Report to the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, 29 Oct 1999." Available on line from http://www.house.gov/international_relations/nkag/report.htm; accessed on 2 Mar 01.

⁹⁰ Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, 315. Costs in casualties and economic to both Korea and the United States, were significantly higher by military estimates of General Luck, see Oberdorfer, page 325.

⁹¹ Cable News Network, Report, "Carter Says North Korea Won't Expel Nuclear Inspectors," 16 June 1994.

⁹² Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, (London: WW Norton & Co.) 1972, p.305.

⁹³ Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*.

(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

⁹⁴ Robert D. Kaplan, *Eastward to Tartary*. (New York: Random House, 2000) page 227. Kaplan provides an eloquent description of the dozen autonomous regions and ethnic groups who are still fighting for control of specific regions in the Caucasus. Kaplan notes, "in the 1990s, the American media and intellectual community embraced the causes of the Bosnian Moslems and Kosovar Albanians, murdered and exiled in campaigns of terror direct mainly by ethnic Serbs, but they virtually ignored similar cases of ethnic killing in the Caucasian regions of Abkhazia, Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakj. Even the problems of sub-Saharan Africa have become known through the coverage of a sympathetic global media while the infinitely complex and intractable Caucasus truly test the limits of Western knowledge of the world—and the West's ability to manage it."

⁹⁵ Tim Judah, *Kosovo, War and Revenge*. (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000). See also Steven L Burg & Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, (London: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1999). These

two superbly written accounts provide a vivid and graphic historical background of the conflict in Eastern Europe. Both books are required reading for students attending the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

⁹⁶ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Korea, a Contemporary History*. (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1997). See Chapter 9 for an explanation of the economic affects the fall of the USSR had on N. Korea. See Chapter 11-13, for a detailed description of North Korea's 1994-1995 nuclear showdown with the United States.

⁹⁷ Project on Defense Alternatives Group, "Briefing Memorandum 18," 5 Feb 2001. A dissenting view available at <http://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html>; Internet; accessed 1 Mar 2001. The three paradoxes of the post-Cold War repudiate a threat-based approach to national security thereby supporting the author. Other paradoxes include the failure to accomplish true reform and military prominence in regional many areas often promotes militarism and competition. An insightful commentary that is long on emotion and short on historical fact. The threat based focus of congress and the DoD after the Cold War obscured the more critical role the US could play in shaping the global environment to deter war and further US economic, military and political interests.

⁹⁸ William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar, Co-Directors of the Avalon Project, Yale University. An on line, full- text copy of the Treaty of Versailles available at: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/menu.htm>; Internet, accessed on 3 Mar 2001.

⁹⁹ President Woodrow Wilson, "Fourteen Points in President Wilson's Congressional Address delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918." See Appendix 3 for a list of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points. For full text copy of President Wilson's address to congress available from <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points.html>; Internet; accessed 27 Feb 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Jon R. Anderson, "GIs react frequently to Iraqi Flare-Ups," *European Stars and Stripes*, 28 Feb 2001. Appendix 5 information on recent military excursions by Iraq is taken from the DoD early bird service Internet service available at <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2001/s20010301gis.htm>; Internet; accessed 1 Mar 2001.

¹⁰¹ Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, North Korea Advisory Group and Chairman, Committee on International Relations, "Report to the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, 29 Oct 1999." Available on line from http://www.house.gov/international_relations/nkag/report.htm; accessed on 2 Mar 01.